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Executive Summary 
This paper provides a review and assessment of the EU Budgetary and Cohesion policy reform 
developments over the past year and the preparations for the 2014-20 period in EoRPA Member 
States.  
Eligibility and allocations 
The European Council agreement on the long-term EU budget for 2014-20 (in February 2013) and the 
VXEVHTXHQW µSROLWLFDO¶ DJUHHPHQW ZLWK WKH (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW -XO\  FRQWDLQHG significant 
changes in EU spending. For Cohesion policy, there is now some certainty on national allocations for 
2014-20. Comparing the 2014-20 allocations with the current allocations reveals marked shifts across 
EU Member States. Although the overall cohesion budget falls, in six countries there is an increase in 
funding. Three of these countries gain significantly in absolute terms: Poland (+¼ELOOLRQ), Romania 
(+¼ ELOOLRQ) and Slovakia by (+¼ ELOOLRQ). At the opposite end of the spectrum, there are very 
significant reductions in expenditure both in absolute and relative terms in a number of countries. 
7KHVHLQFOXGH6SDLQDQG*HUPDQ\ZKLFKHDFKORVHLQH[FHVVRI¼ELOOLRQLQ&RKHVLRQSROLF\UHFHLSWV
equivalent to well over a quarter of their current allocations. It is also noteworthy that Greece and 
Hungary also see major reduction in their allocations, even though these two countries did well from 
the negotiations.  
The new Partnership Agreements and Operational Programmes 
With Inter-Institutional negotiations on the Cohesion policy budget and regulations almost concluded, 
strategic planning for the next period has accelerated. Attention in all Member States is now firmly 
focused on the preparation of the Partnership Agreements and Operational Programmes for 2014-20. 
Extensive consultation process have been launched or finalised and discussions with the European 
Commission have intensified during 2013. Progress with the drafting of Partnership Agreements and 
Operational Programmes is variable across EU countries, but the aim is to formally submit the 
majority of PAs towards the end of 2013.  
A review of the content and delivery arrangements of the new strategies reveals several trends. First, 
there is evidence of closer strategic alignment across ESI Funds and with Europe 2020 themes, the 
latter being driven by the thematic concentration and ring-fencing requirements. Second, major 
changes in the programme architecture are planned in several Member States involving a 
considerable reduction in the number of programmes and/or the use of multi-fund programmes. Third 
and related, there are shifts in the allocation of Cohesion policy competences across different levels 
of governance in response to shifts in the policy architecture, efficiency considerations and political 
priorities. Fourth, there is evidence of increased attention to performance issues, but it remains to be 
seen whether a qualitative shift in the performance orientation will be achieved and delivered on the 
ground. Fifth, the most tangible innovation with respect to the territorial dimension is the reinforced 
sub-regional or local agenda through the new provisions on Community-Led Local Development, 
Integrated Territorial Investments and sustainable urban development. However, the degree to which 
these options will be used in practice is still unclear. 
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The implications of economic governance changes for Cohesion policy 
Looking forward, there are some radical developments in tKH(8¶VHFRQRPLFJRYHUQDQFHDJHQGDZLWK
potentially profound implications for the rationale of Cohesion policy. The pressure to move towards a 
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union involving a more integrated financial, budgetary and 
economic policy framework. Tighter fiscal discipline on Member States could affect their capacity to 
co-finance Cohesion Policy, especially in countries with large Cohesion allocations and public 
expenditure constraints, while the proposals for a new fiscal capacity at EU level through a 
Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument may overlap with Cohesion Policy. Moreover, in using 
Cohesion policy as an economic governance tool to implement wider EU objectives, notably through 
macroeconomic conditionality and in supporting the implementation of Country-specific 
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV WKH SROLF\¶V WUDGLWLRQDO 7UHDW\ FRPPLWPHQW WR FRKHVLRQ DQG WKH UHGXFWLRQ RI
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1. INTRODUCTION 
7KH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLO$JUHHPHQWRQWKH(8¶VMulti-annual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-20 
LQ)HEUXDU\DQGWKHVXEVHTXHQWµSROLWLFDO¶DJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW-XO\
has brought to an end two years of intense negotiations on the size and shape of the long-term 
budget of the EU. The XSSHU OLPLWRIEXGJHWFRPPLWPHQWVZDVVHWDWSHUFHQWRI(8*1, ¼
ELOOLRQZLWKSD\PHQWVH[SHFWHG WREHSHUFHQWRI(8*1, ¼ELOOLRQ7KHVHDUH UHGXFWLRQV
compared to the current limits in 2007-13 ±  SHUFHQW ¼ DQG  SHUFHQW ¼ ELOOLRQ
respectively ± of around three percent in real terms.  
The Cohesion policy budget for 2014-20 ± ¼ELOOLRQ- will decline by 8.4 percent, bringing its share 
to a third of the overall budget on a par with the Common Agricultural Policy. The official publication of 
national allocations in August 2013 confirms a significant shift in the allocation of Cohesion policy 
resources across Member States. Although the overall cohesion budget falls, there is an increase in 
funding in six countries and a very significant reduction in a number of countries.  
In parallel to the negotiations on the multi-annual financial framework, further progress has been 
made on the negotiation of the Cohesion policy regulations although the adoption of the legislative 
framework is still pending. The European Parliament has particular concerns about macroeconomic 
conditionality and the performance reserve which, alongside wider economic governance 
developments, may have profound implications for the rationale and operation of Cohesion policy in 
the future. Nevertheless, the adoption of the regulatory package is anticipated to take place in mid-
October.  
In parallel with the negotiations, the preparations for the new Partnership Agreements and 
Operational Programmes have accelerated throughout 2013. Extensive consultations are underway 
or have been finalised, and successive drafts of the strategies have been developed in many 
countries. While final versions of the Partnership Agreements are expected to be submitted to the 
Commission towards the end of 2013, approval of the majority of Operational Programmes is unlikely 
to take place till the second quarter of 2014. The design of the strategies envisage more strategic 
coordination, strong concentration on Europe 2020 objectives and, in some cases, major changes in 
the programme architecture and governance arrangements.  
The aim of this paper is to provide a review and assessment of the EU Budgetary and Cohesion 
policy reform developments over the past year and the preparations for the 2014-20 phase in the 
EoRPA Member States. It begins by reviewing the context for reform with respect to the fallout of the 
crisis, economic governance developments and the implications for Cohesion policy. The next section 
examines the progress achieved in the EU budget negotiations, notably the outcome of European 
Council agreement achieved in February 2013, and the negotiations of the Cohesion policy 
regulations. An assessment of the shifts in eligibility and financial allocations under the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds is taken up in the next section. A final section reviews the preparations under way on 
the design, content and management of the new round of Partnership Agreements and Operational 
Programmes for 2014-20. The paper presents some conclusions and issues for discussion. 
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2. THE CRISIS, ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE REFORM AND 
COHESION POLICY 
The reform of EU Cohesion policy has been taking place against a turbulent European economic and 
political background. The Eurozone has been in recession throughout 2012 and early 2013, 
unemployment and public debt have risen to unprecedented levels and anti-euro sentiment 
has been growing in many countries. In 2013, Cyprus became the fifth country to request a bail-out 
due to its troubled financial sector and over-exposure to Greek debt, which was granted in March 
2013 and set the precedent of extending burden sharing to insured bank deposits and required capital 
controls. The deal was widely recognised as being problematic and brought other small economies 
with large financial sectors into the spotlight of financial speculation, notably Malta and Slovenia. It 
also highlighted the on-going political challenges faced by EU leaders in addressing the key 
institutional design flaws of EMU, progress on which was stalled by the sensitivities of the national 
elections in Germany in October 2013.  
There was, however, some positive economic news. The Eurozone emerged from the double dip 
recession in the second quarter of 2013 and EU institutions have put forward several proposals for a 
so-called ¶Genuine Economic and Monetary Union¶ (GEMU). 7KH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
December 2012 report, A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, provided 
the most comprehensive outline of how greater integration amongst euro area countries might be 
designed.1 In addition, a vision for GEMU was set out by the President of the European Council, 
Herman Van RomSX\LQWKHHDUOLHUµ)RXU3UHVLGHQW¶V5HSRUW¶VXEWLWOHG µ7RZDUGVD*HQXLQH(FRQRPLF
DQG0RQHWDU\8QLRQ¶.2 These proposals set out several building blocks for the future of EMU, some of 
which have potentially important consequences for EU Cohesion policy.  
Proposals for an integrated budgetary framework encompass the stricter fiscal rules already agreed 
as part of the six-pack, two-pack and Fiscal Compact and potentially a new fiscal capacity separate 
from the existing EU budget (Box 1). The main role would be to provide temporary support for 
structural reforms on a case-by-case basis and a shock-absorption function over the longer-term to 
support macroeconomic stabilisation. The implications for Cohesion Policy are two-fold: tighter fiscal 
disciplines on Member States could affect their capacity to co-finance Cohesion Policy especially 
where EU funds account for a large share of domestic development expenditure; and the new fiscal 
capacity could overlap with Cohesion policy interventions. The Commission Communication 
proposals state that ¶the new financial instrument would need to be consistent, coherent and 
complementary to the existing instruments, such as the Structural Funds, and in particular the 
European Social Fund.¶ 
                                                 
1
 European Commission (2012) A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union Launching a 
European Debate, Commission Communication, COM(2012) 777 final, 28.11.2012, Brussels.  
2
 European Council (2012) )RXU3UHVLGHQW¶V5HSRUW7RZDUGVD*HQXLQH(FRQRPLFDQG0RQHWDU\8QLRQ, Report 
by President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy, 26 June 2012, Brussels. 
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Box 1: Proposals for a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument  
A Commission Communication on a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument (CCI) sets out options for two 
instruments - contractual arrangements for Member States to undertake specific reforms and financial support to 
help Member States implement these reforms: 
 
x Contractual arrangements would lay down the key measures a Member State commits to put in place 
with agreed timelines. The measures would be designed to implement the Country Specific 
Recommendations agreed as part of the European Semester, in particular those emanating from the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure.  
 
x A financial instrument would complement the contracts, in principle within the EU budget but outside 
the ceilings set in the MFF, to promote and support the reforms when an individual Member State is 
under stress.  
The rationale for the CCI is to support the rebalancing, adjustment and growth of the euro area economies and 
serve as a first step towards a stronger fiscal capacity ± which would entail more deeply integrated economic 
policies.  
The Commission will also examine ways for Member States that are not part of the euro area, and in particular 
those preparing for euro accession, to enter a contractual arrangement. 
A range of consultation questions are put forward in the document concerning whether the instrument would be 
DYDLODEOH WR DOO RU RQO\ µE\ LQYLWDWLRQ¶ ZKDW VRUW of reforms it should support, how it should be negotiated (the 
Commission does not mention the European Parliament in this regard), how parliaments and other stakeholders 
are involved in consultations regarding contracts, and how it should be funded. 
On the basis of further discussion with the European Parliament and the Council, the Commission will make a 
proposal in the course of 2013. 
Source: European Commission (2013) Towards a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, The 
introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument, COM(2013) 165 final, 20.3.2013, Brussels: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/pdf/2039_165_final_en.pdf 
Another key building block in the path towards a genuine EMU is an integrated economic policy 
framework which envisages closer coordination of national economic policies. An implication of 
this for Cohesion Policy is that the rationale for policy intervention will include not just the benefits for 
the regions receiving support, but also wider common goals of the EU. This orientation was already 
visible in the expectation during the current programming period that Lisbon agenda goals would be 
prominent in Cohesion policy. This coordination element has been reinforced in the draft Cohesion 
policy Regulations for 2014-20, particularly the requirement to take account of Country-specific 
Recommendations (CSR) issued under the European semester cycle in the programming of the new 
Partnership Agreements and Operational Programmes. The 2013 CSRs were issued in May 2013,3 
the most relevant ones to Cohesion policy being in the areas of structural reform (notably, R&D and 
innovation, resource efficiency, network industries) and employment and social policy (excluding 
wage-setting mechanisms). 
Aside from these broader economic governance developments, the crisis has had severe and 
varied impacts on regional development across the EU with consequences for spending under 
the current programmes and the design of the next generation of programmes.4 The key finding 
of the recent Progress Report on Cohesion examining the urban and regional dimension of the crisis 
in the EU is one of growing regional disparities and a halt in the pre-crisis convergence process 
across EU regions. Key conclusions of the analysis were as follows: 
                                                 
3
 European Commission (2013) Moving Europe beyond the crisis: country-specific recommendations 2013, Press 
Release IP/13/463, 29 May 2013, Brussels: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-463_en.htm 
4
 European Commission (2013) The Urban and Regional Dimension of the Crisis, Eighth Progress Report on 
Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, Brussels. 
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x two thirds of EU regions suffered a contraction of their GDP between 2007 and 2010; 
x the ten regions with the weakest performance are in the three Baltic States and one of the two 
Irish regions, while the strongest regional performance was seen in Poland, Germany, 
Sweden, Slovakia and the Czech Republic; 
x four-fifths of EU regions saw unemployment rise between 2008 and 2010, including a 
doubling or tripling in the worst affected countries, especially in Spain, Greece, Ireland and 
the Baltic States;  
x increased youth unemployment was also marked in regions within most of these countries, 
while the share of people aged 15to 24 not in employment, education or training (NEET) rose 
in almost four out of five regions, especially in Romania, Greece and the United Kingdom; 
x by contrast, unemployment fell in German regions, especially in the eastern Länder, as did 
youth unemployment in most German regions, in 5 Belgian regions and in 4 Austrian regions. 
The report also examines the urban impact of the crisis, distinguishing between metro regions - 
NUTS-3 regions that represent urban agglomerations of more than 250,000 inhabitants ± and EU 
cities defined at national level. Falls in GDP were witnessed in two thirds of metro regions between 
2007-10, especially in smaller metros. By contrast, capital metro regions performed better. 
Employment was more resilient in the vast majority of metro regions over this period compared to 
non-metro regions (especially in Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria). 
Again, employment performance was stronger in capital metros. Poverty and social exclusion is highly 
concentrated in cities, which has intensified by one percentage point across EU cities, although the 
risk of poverty and exclusion for people living in cities in EU12 countries is much lower on average. 
Cities in the more developed Member States tend to have lower employment rates and higher 
unemployment rates than towns, suburbs and rural areas, while the opposite is the case in less-
developed Member States. The crisis has not altered this pattern.  
Looking forward, the main policy implication highlighted by the Commission is the need for 
concentration of expenditure on the key areas of employment (particularly for young people), 
training and education, social inclusion, innovation and SMEs, energy efficiency and a low-carbon 
economy. It argues that in less-developed countries investments in innovation and smart 
specialisation could improve the performance of the export sector, which is seen as critical in contexts 
of low internal demand and business competitiveness. Lastly, as the fallout of the banking crisis is 
continuing to impact on the construction sector, investing in energy efficiency of buildings could help 
to restore some of the jobs lost in the sector.  
A more immediate concern has been the impact of the crisis on financial spending under the 
current round of Cohesion policy programmes. This has led to the adoption of new measures at 
EU level to alleviate the impact on spending. During 2011-12, EU co-financing rates were increased in 
nine Member States (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania and Portugal and to a lesser extent 
Belgium, France and United Kingdom). Additional 'top-up' payments (increasing co-financing rates up 
to 95 percent) were made to countries with greatest budgetary difficulties (Greece, Ireland, Latvia, 
Portugal, Romania and Hungary).5 More recently, Commission proposals were issued in May 2013 to 
allow a continued extension of increased EU co-financing rates (by up ten percentage points) for 
countries receiving financial assistance under macro-economic adjustment programmes (currently, 
                                                 
5
 European Commission (2013) EU Cohesion policy contributing to employment and growth in Europe, Joint 
paper from the Directorates-General for Regional & Urban Policy and Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, 
European Commission, Brussels. 
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Cyprus, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Portugal, Greece and Ireland), which must be compensated by 
increased national co-financing at the end of the programme period. The draft legislation also 
proposes to allow a one-year extension of the automatic decommitment period of the 2011 and 2012 
commitments for Romania and Slovakia.6 These proposals are currently being negotiated with the 
European Parliament and should come into force shortly. 
  
                                                 
6
 European Commission (2013) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 as regards certain provisions relating to financial management 
for certain Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial 
stability and to the decommitment rules for certain Member States. 
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3. FINALISING THE 2014-20 BUDGET AND COHESION POLICY 
REGULATIONS 
3.1 The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
More than two years after the Commission published its proposals for 2014-20, the multi-annual 
financial framework has yet to be formally agreed. The starting point for the negotiations was the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEXGJHWDU\SURSRVDOVSXEOLVKHGLQ-XQHAs reviewed in a previous EPRC paper,7 
the Danish Presidency issued the first so-FDOOHG µQHJRWLDWLQJ ER[¶, setting out financial and 
methodological provisions and options on all elements of the MFF, but the main substantive 
negotiations did not take place till autumn 2012 under the Cyprus Presidency, on the basis of a further 
two negotiation boxes. From November onwards, the lead coordination role was taken by the 
President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, culminating in a European Council 
agreement in February 2013 during the Irish Presidency. 
The European Council agreement8 contained some significant changes in EU spending, including a 
new methodology for allocating Cohesion policy funding. The upper limit of commitments was set at 
SHUFHQWRI(8*1, ¼ELOOLRQZLWKSD\PHQWVH[SHFWHG WREHSHUFHQWRI(8*1, ¼
billion). These are reductions compared to the current limits in 2007-13 ±  SHUFHQW ¼ DQG
SHUFHQW¼ELOOLRQUHVSHFWLYHO\± of around three percent in real terms.  
The most significant shifts across budget headings are: 
x Common Agricultural Policy: direct payments will fall by 17.5 percent compared to the last 
MFF, although the CAP will still account for a third of the overall budget. 
x Cohesion policy: spending will decline by 8.4 percent, bringing its share to a third of the 
overall budget on a par with the CAP. 
x Smart and inclusive growth: which includes Research & Innovation, Trans-European 
Infrastructure (the Connecting Europe Facility), education (Erasmus), will see the biggest 
relative increase in spending of 37.3 percent. 
x Security and Citizenship: sees a significant increase of 26.8 percent. 
Despite the reduction in the overall size of the budget compared to the Commission proposal, the 
structure proposed has been largely been preserved and the main direction of the shifts are in line 
ZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VJRDOV 
                                                 
7
 Mendez C, Wishlade F and Bachtler J (2012) Negotiation boxes and blocks: Crafting a deal on the EU Budget 
and Cohesion policy , European Policy Research Papers, No. 82 , European Policies Research Centre, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow: http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_82.pdf 
8
 European Council 7/8 February 2013, Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework), EUCO 37/13, at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/135344.pdf  
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Table 1: Comparison of 2014-20 and 2007-13 MFFs (2011 prices) 
 2014-20 MFF 2007-13 MFF Change Change, % 
Commitment appropriations ¼PLOOLRQ ¼PLOOLRQ ¼ % 
1. Smart and inclusive growth  450,763 446,310 +4.5bn +1.0 
1a. Competitiveness for Growth and Jobs 125,614 91,495 +34.1bn +37.3 
1b. Economic, social and territorial cohesion 325,149 354,815 -29.7bn -8.4 
2. Sustainable growth: Natural Resources 373,179 420,682 -47.5bn -11.3 
Of which: market related expenditure and 
direct payments 277,851 336,685 -58.8bn -17.5 
3. Security and Citizenship  15,686 12,366 +3.3bn +26.8 
4. Global Europe 58,704 56,815 +1.9bn +3.3 
5. Administration 61,629 57,082 +4.5bn +8 
6. Compensations 27 n/a +27.0bn n/a 
Total commitment appropriations 959,988 994,176 -35.2bn -3.5 
As a percentage of GNI 1.00% 1.12% 
  
Total payment appropriations 908,400 942,778 -34.4bn -3.7 
As a percentage of GNI 0.95% 1.06% 
  
     
Emergency Aid Reserve 1,960 1,697 +0.3bn 15.5 
European Globalisation Fund 1,050 3,573 -2.5bn -70.6 
Solidarity Fund 3,500 7,146 -3.6bn -51.0 
Flexibility Instrument 3,300 1,429 +1.9bn +130.9 
EDF 26,984 26,826 +0.2bn +0.6 
Total Outside 36,794 40,670 -3.9bn -9.5 
As a percentage of GNI 0.04% 0.05%   
 
    
Total MFF + Outside 996,782 1,035,031 -38.2bn -3.7 
As a percentage of GNI 1.04% 1.17%   
Source: European Council. 
 
The provisions on Cohesion policy eligibility and allocations will be reviewed in detail in the next 
section. It is worth highlighting, however, several other financial provisions that were agreed at the 
European Council with important consequences for Cohesion policy.  
x Macro-economic conditionality: this provides for sanctions when macro-economic 
conditions are violated, namely 50-100 percent of the CSF Funds in the case of a breach 
XQGHU WKH µH[FHVVLYH GHILFLW SURFHGXUH¶ DQG - SHUFHQW LQ WKH FDVH RI DQ µH[FHVVLYH
LPEDODQFHSURFHGXUH¶ ULVLQJ WR WKHKLJKHU OHYHOJUDGXDOO\ LQ OLQHZLWK WKHVHULRXVQHVVRI WKH
breach and subject to nominal caps of GDP which also vary according to the two procedures: 
0.25 percent of GDP for excessive imbalances and 0.5 percent for excessive deficits.  
 
x Performance reserve: all Member States are required to establish a national performance 
reserve consisting of 7 percent of their total allocations (an increase on the four percent level 
initially proposed by the Commission). 
 
x Pre-financing rates: set at one percent of total OP allocations each year between 2014-16, 
or 1.5 percent during 2014-15 for Member States receiving financial assistance programmes.  
 
x Automatic decommitment: the rule is extend by one year to n+3 for all programmes, and a 
provision commits to finding a solution for decommitment challenges in Romania and 
Slovakia during the current 2007-13 period. 
 
x Appraisal: The General Affairs Council will discuss every two years the implementation and 
results of the CSF funds and will provide input to the Spring Council's overall assessment of 
all EU policies to deliver growth and jobs. Projects RYHU¼PLOOLRQVKRXOGEHVXEMHFWWRPRUH
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extensive ex ante appraisal by the Commission. Ambitious targets must be agreed for the 
OPs, including financial and output indicators, and failure to meet these may lead to financial 
corrections. 
 
x Project selection: Member States must ensure that the selection of projects is based on 
procedures and criteria, which are non-discriminatory, transparent and in full compliance with 
Union and national law so that only the best projects are chosen.  
 
x VAT: this will not be eligible for a contribution from the )XQGV DQG IURP WKH ¼ billion 
Cohesion Fund transfer to the Connecting Europe Facility. However, VAT amounts shall be 
eligible where they are not recoverable under national VAT legislation. 
The next stage in the MFF negotiations is to reach an Inter-Institutional Agreement with the European 
Parliament, which is expected in October 2013. The Parliament's formal mandate to negotiate was 
approved in a resolution on 13 March 2013 which rejected the European Council conclusions (of 8 
February 2013) and called for more flexibility and efficiency within the budget. In particular, the 
resolution advocated flexibility to allow available funds to be used optimally and for a review of 
spending to give the next elected Parliament and the Commission to influence the MFF. Furthermore, 
the Parliament called for a system of genuine own resources to fund the EU budget and stressed that 
all EU expenditure should go through the budget. The resolution also highlighted the growing problem 
of payment shortfalls, which prevent commitments being paid and jeopardize EU Cohesion policy 
programmes in particular.  
6XEVHTXHQWO\D µSROLWLFDODJUHHPHQW¶ZDVUHDFKHGZLWK WKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW LQ ODWH-XQH
7KHGHDOGLGQRWDOWHUWKHWRWDOEXGJHWRI¼ELOOLRQVHWE\WKH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLOLQ)HEUXDU\3, 
but provided for more frontloading of expenditure and increased flexibility for transferring unspent 
funds to other years and priority areas. The front-loading included increases in 2014-15 of: ¼
million for research; ¼ PLOOLRQ IRU WKH (UDVPXV SURgramme; and ¼ PLOOLRQ IRU WKH &260(
Programme to help the competitiveness of smaller businesses. For the youth employment initiative, 
an extension of funding for the 2014-20 period was agreed, instead of the first two years of the period. 
It was also agrHHGWKDWWKH)XQGIRU(XURSHDQ$LGWRWKH0RVW'HSULYHGZRXOGEHLQFUHDVHGIURP¼
ELOOLRQWR¼ELOOLRQfor use by Member States on a voluntary basis. Lastly, a new budgetary review 
clause will allow the budget to be revised in 2016 for implementation in 2017.  
7KH ILQDO OHJDOO\ ELQGLQJ YRWH LQ 3DUOLDPHQW ZLOO RQO\ WDNH SODFH ZKHQ WKH ¼ ELOOLRQ QHHGHG WR
balance the 2013 budget is confirmed by the Council, expected at the end of October 2013. This will 
allow the approval of the Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) on the MFF, a draft of which was 
published by the Commission on 4 September 2013 including six draft declarations on: own 
resources; best use of public spending; gender issues related to the annual budget; amounts for the 
Youth Employment, Horizon 2020, Erasmus and COSME; national management declarations; and the 
review of the MFF. 
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3.2 The Cohesion policy legislative framework 
In parallel with the negotiations on the multi-annual financial framework, further progress has been 
made on the negotiation of the Cohesion policy regulations, associated secondary legislation and 
various guidance documents to inform programming. Nevertheless, the adoption of the legislative 
framework is still pending. The Regulations are likely to be approved during November 2013, which 
could lead to delays in adopting Partnership Agreements and programmes. Informal feedback from 
the European Commission suggests that the aim is to adopt Partnership Agreements by end of the 
year and all programmes before the European elections in May 2014 or before the summer break. 
Table 2: Expected adoption of legislative framework for the 2014-20 period  
Legislative decisions and guidance for 2014-20  Likely adoption 
Inter-institutional 
legislation 
Adoption of EU 2014-20 Legislative Package November 2013 
Adoption of Delegated and Implementing Acts 




Adoption of Partnership Agreements  
Adoption of Operational Programmes 
By end of 2013 
May-July 2014 
Guidance Guidance notes for the 2014-20 period Throughout 2013 
 
An important development in late 2012 was the launch of the inter-institutional negotiations between 
the Council, Commission and European Parliament. An intensive programme of meetings was 
organised. By mid-September, around 65 trialogues were held on the Regulations. Agreement was 
reached on key blocks - Performance Framework, Ex-ante conditionalities, Technical Assistance, 
Eligibility, Monitoring and Evaluation, Management and Control, Information and Communication, 
Major Projects and Revenue Generating Operations and PPPs. Considerable groundwork has been 
done on the remaining CPR blocks, but there are open issues still to be agreed. 
The European Parliament claims that it has secured many improvements including greater 
involvement of local and regional authorities in planning and implementation, more flexibility with 
regard to thematic concentration and a particular focus on environmental issues in the Cohesion Fund 
Regulation. The most problematic provisions are all related to financial issues: macroeconomic 
conditionality; the performance reserve; co-financing; pre-financing; the ESF share of total allocations. 
The Parliament is aiming to achieve a compromise by negotiating these issues as a package but is 
under strong time pressure because the MFF cannot be agreed till these outstanding issues are 
resolved. The Parliament¶V DLP ZDV to conclude the inter-institutional negotiations by the end of 
September 2013 with a view to adopting the Regulations in a plenary vote in October 2013. However, 
difficulties in agreeing to the macroeconomic conditionality provisions (notably relating to the 
3DUOLDPHQW¶VUROHLQGHFLVLRQRQILQDQFLDOVXVSHQVLRQV led to this vote being postponed till November 
2013.  
Aside from the primary legislation, there is a raft of secondary legislation to prepare for 2014-20. The 
Regulations foresee a wide range of Delegated and Implementing Acts relating to various 
programming and implementation issues (Table 3 $Q µ([SHUW *URXS RQ WKH 'HOHJated and 
,PSOHPHQWLQJ $FWV IRU WKH (XURSHDQ 6WUXFWXUDO DQG ,QYHVWPHQW )XQGV¶ KDV EHHQ PHHWLQJ RQ D
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monthly basis since the start of 2013 to assist and advise the Commission on the Delegated Acts and 
to provide informal advice on the preparation of the Implementing Acts before formal consideration at 
Council committee level. There have been contentious debates on the content of the Acts as well as 
procedural/competence disputes about which type of act should be used. To take one example, the 
Commission consiGHUV WKDWDQ ,PSOHPHQWLQJ$FWVKRXOGEHDGRSWHG IRU µ,QQRYDWLYH$FWLRQV¶EXW WKH
Council has argued for the use of a Delegated Act. 
Table 3: Delegated and Implementing Acts in preparation (by end October 2013) 
Delegated Acts Implementing Acts 
x European code of conduct on partnership 
x General rules on eligibility of expenditure for 
Cooperation Programmes 
x Simplified cost options 
x EGTC indicators 
x Management and control systems 
x Financial Instruments 
 
x Categories of intervention and the methodology 
for tracking of climate change expenditure 
x Major projects 
x E-cohesion and data exchange  
x Financial Instruments 
x Information and communication 
x Joint Actions Plans 
x Monitoring and Reporting 
x Management and control systems 
 
In parallel with the development of the Regulatory package, the Commission has prepared various 
guidance documents to assist the Member States and regions in the programming for 2014-20. Of 
particular importance in the first two quarters of 2013 are the templates on the Partnership Agreement 
and programmes, along with guidance on ex-ante conditionalities, territorial instruments, the 
performance framework and fraud risk assessment.  
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4. COHESION POLICY 2014-20: ELIGIBILITY AND ALLOCATIONS 
As noted in the previous chapter, the European Parliament has still to give its consent to the 
Multiannual Financial Framework, but following lengthy and tortuous negotiations, first in Council then 
with the European Parliament, political agreement was reached in July 2013.9 It therefore now seems 
unlikely that significant changes will be made to these spending plans; indeed, in late August 2013 
DG Regio made public the indicative Cohesion policy allocations for each Member State.10 
7KHVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVZHUHWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEudgetary proposals published in June 
201111 and the draft Cohesion Policy Regulation issued in October 2011.12 The first so-called 
µQHJRWLDWLQJ ER[¶ WKDW UHYHDOHG VRPH RI WKH PHFKDQLFV RI WKH ILQDQFLDO DOORFDWLRQ SURFHVVHV ZDV
issued in spring 2012,13 but no substantive progress was made on budgetary matters during the 
Denmark Presidency.14 In July 2012 the Commission published revised proposals for the Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF), principally to take account of new data, but also to factor in the 
accession of Croatia.15 
The main substance of the budgetary negotiations took place in autumn 2012 with two negotiating 
boxes published by the Cyprus Presidency in September16 and October.17 Thereafter, the lead was 
taken by the President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy who produced two negotiating 
boxes in November 2012 and a third in February 201318 during the Ireland Presidency; this formed the 
basis for agreement by the European Council.19 
Having reviewed the main outcomes of the EU Budget negotiations, the main focus of this section is 
on the implications for EU Cohesion policy and how the outcomes compare with those for 2007-13. 
The remainder of this section is in four parts. First, it sketches out the new policy architecture. 
Second, it outlines the provisions on spatial coverage and how they differ from the current position. 
                                                 
9
 Parliament adopts resolution on MFF 2014-2020 - Statement by Financial Programming and Budget 
Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski, - MEMO/13/646, 03/07/2013: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-646_en.htm  
10
 See: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/future/eligibility/index_en.cfm  
11
 European Commission (2011) A budget for Europe 2020, COM(2011)500 final of 29 June 2011. 
12
 European Commission (2011) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social fund, the Cohesion 
Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
covered by the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions of the European Regional 
Development fund, the European social fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 
1083/2006, COM(2011)615 final of 6 October 2011. 
13
 Presidency (2012) Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-2020) ± Section of the Negotiating Box Relating to 
Heading 1, Doc 7635/12, 12 June: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st07/st07635.en12.pdf  
14
 As in the past, the Commission made a number of points of clarification through so-FDOOHGµILFKHV¶LQ2007-13 
these were available through the European Parliament Budget Committee website. For 2014-20 they were not 
made publicly available, but we are indebted to several of the EoRPA partners for providing these documents. 
15
 European Commission (2012) Amended proposal for a Council Regulation laying down the multiannual 
financial framework for the years 2014-2020, COM(2012)388 final of 6 July 2012. 
16
 Presidency (2012) Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-20) ± Negotiating Box, 13620/12, 18 September: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st13/st13620.en12.pdf  
17
 Presidency (2012) Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-20) ± Negotiating Box 15599/12, 29 October: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st15/st15599.en12.pdf  
18
 The negotiating boxes produced by Herman van Rompuy were not formally published at the time but were 
circulating widely on the internet. 
19
 European Council 7/8 February 2013, Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework) EUCO 37/13, at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/135344.pdf  
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Third, it reviews the financial allocation process, focusing on changes in relation to 2007-13. Last, it 
compares the outcomes from the recent negotiations with the position in 2007-13. 
4.1 Policy architecture 
,QWHUPVRIRYHUDOOSROLF\DUFKLWHFWXUHWKHGUDIW*HQHUDO5HJXODWLRQLGHQWLILHVWZRµJRDOV¶IRU&RKHVLRQ
policy:20 
x Investment for growth and jobs in Member States and regions, to be supported by all the 
Funds; and 
x European territorial cooperation (ETC), to be supported by the ERDF. 
In financial terms, the Commission proposals had allocated 96 percent of the total for these goals to 
investment for growth and jobs; this rose to over 97 percent in the final outcome, ETC being (in 
percentage terms) the main casualty of the negotiations. For investment for growth and jobs three 
categories of NUTS 2 region are defined: 
x Less-Developed Regions (LDR), where GDP is less than 75 percent of the EU27 average;21 
x Transition Regions (TR), where GDP is above 75 percent, but below 90 percent of the EU27 
average; and 
x More-Developed Regions (MDR) where GDP is above 90 percent of the EU27 average. 
The overall resources proposed for the Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion sub-heading for 
2014-DUH¼ELOOLRQSULFHV - LQFOXGLQJWKH<RXWK(PSOR\PHQW,QLWLDWLYH<(,µWRS-XS¶
RI ¼ ELOOLRQ22 7KLV LV D UHGXFWLRQ RI DURXQG IRXU SHUFHQW RQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V RULJLQDO SURSRVDO RI
¼%LOOLRQ 
This total is broken down between eligible areas as set out in Table 4, which also compares 
allocations for 2007-RQWKHVDPHSULFHEDVLVDORQJZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRULJLQDOSURSRVDO7Kis 
shows an overall decrease LQSURSRVHGH[SHQGLWXUHIURP¼ELOOLRQLQ-WR¼ELOOLRQLQ
2014-20. IQEURDGWHUPVWKH&RPPLVVLRQSURSRVDOVDOUHDG\LQYROYHGDUHGXFWLRQRIVRPH¼ELOOLRQ
LQ&RKHVLRQSROLF\VSHQGLQJWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVFXWDIXUWKHU¼ELOOLRQIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQSODQV 
In absolute terms, the LDR budget is cut most ± IURP¼ELOOLRQWR¼ELOOLRQ,QSUDFWLFHKRZHYHU
the reduced coverage of LDR areas means that the decrease in per capita aid intensity is quite 
modest ± IURP¼WR¼SHUKHDGSHU\HDU0RUHRYHUWKHQHJRWLDWLQJSURFHVVEDUHO\DIIHFWHGWKH
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOVfor LDR funding, at least in aggregate terms. 
For the Cohesion Fund, disregarding the transitional arrangements for Spain in 2007-13 and those for 
Cyprus in 2014- WKH DEVROXWH DPRXQWV IDOO YHU\ VOLJKWO\ IURP ¼ ELOOLRQ WR ¼ ELOOLRQ WKH
CommissioQKDGSURSRVHGDKLJKHUDEVROXWHDPRXQW ¼ELOOLRQZKLFKZRXOGKDYHUHVXOWHG LQD
KLJKHU DLG LQWHQVLW\ ¼ WKDQ LQ -13. However, this was downgraded in the course of the 
negotiations. Moreover, the accession of Croatia increases the population eligible for the Cohesion 
                                                 
20
 Draft Cohesion Policy Regulation, Article 81(2), COM(2011)615 final.  
21
 Note that, because Croatia had not acceded to the EU at the time of the negotiations, EU27 was used as the 
benchmark for al eligibility and allocation criteria. 
22
 European Council 7/8 February 2013, Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework) EUCO 37/13, at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/135344.pdf  
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)XQGZLWKWKHUHVXOWWKDWDLGLQWHQVLW\IDOOVIURP¼LQ-WR¼SHUKHDGSHUDQQXPLQ-
20 (again excluding Spain and Cyprus, respectively). 
Allocations for the TR are not readily comparable with those for the Phasing-out and Phasing-in 
regions. This is mainly because they are defined in quite different ways. Phasing-out and Phasing-in 
regions were, by definition, regions which had (or should have had) Objective 1 status in the previous 
period, whereas TR are defined solely in relation to per capita GDP. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that the Commission proposals for TR funding were a major casualty of the negotiations in relative 
WHUPVZLWKVRPHSHUFHQWEHLQJWULPPHGIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRULJLQDOSODQV 
For the same reason, allocations for the MDR are not directly comparable with those for Regional 
&RPSHWLWLYHQHVVDQG(PSOR\PHQW5&(DUHDVLQWKHODVWSHULRG$JDLQKRZHYHUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
RULJLQDOSODQVZHUHFXUWDLOHGZLWK WKH ILQDORXWFRPHVRPH¼ELOOLRQVhort of the initial proposal. Aid 
intensity is slightly higher in 2014-DW¼SHUKHDGSHUDQQXPFRPSDUHGWR¼LQ-13 for 
RCE; however, the MRD figure is inflated by the special provisions for former Convergence regions 
that will have MRD status in 2014-20. 
Table 4: 2007-13 EU27 and 2014-20 EU28 commitment appropriations (2011 prices) 
  2007-13 2014-20 COM Prop 2014-20 Council Concs 









Conv / LDR 202320 57.5 187.9 163561 48.4 185.2 163704 50.3 185.4 
Cohesion 
Fund 70331 20.0 60.6 70740 20.4 78.4 66130 20.3 72.9 
TR, of 
which: 26170 7.4 105.6 36471 11.6 74.0 31550 9.7 64.0 
x Phasing-
out 14305 4.1 124.6 
   
 0.0  
x Phasing-
in 11865 3.4 89.2 
   
 0.0  
RCE/MDR 44263 12.6 21.4 55419 15.8 25.8 49336 15.2 23 
Territorial 
coop/ETC 8626 2.5 2.5 11878 3.5 3.4 8919 2.7 2.5 
OMR & LPD 
   
925 
 
20.0 1382 0.4 30.0 
YEI 
      3000 0.9  




325149 100.0  
Notes: (i) The 2007-13 figure for the Cohesion Fund includes the transitional arrangements for Spain otherwise 
SHUFDSLWDDQQXDODLGLQWHQVLW\ZRXOGEHF¼WKH-20 Cohesion Fund figure similarly contains the 
WUDQVLWLRQDOVXPVIRU&\SUXVRWKHUZLVHDLGLQWHQVLW\ZRXOGEHF¼LL&RPPLWPHQWDppropriations for 
Outermost regions and low population density regions were not disaggregated as such in 2007-13 (though they 
were calculated separately). (iii) The 2007-13 figures are drawn from the original regulation and do not include 
the later adjustments made in respect of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia on account of the divergence 
between forecast and actual GDP ± see European Commission Communication on the technical adjustment of 
the MFF for 2011, COM(2010)160 final, 16 April 2010. (iv) Prices are adjusted using DG ECFIN deflators. 
Source: Own calculations from Fiche no. 2 addendum, Eurostat data and DG ECFIN AMECO online and DG 
Regio provisional financial allocations between Member States ± see footnote 10 above. 
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In relative terms, the ETC budget lost most from the negotiations, with almost a quarter being cut from 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSODQV+RZHYHU WKHRYHUDOOEXGJHW LVPDLQWDLQHGDWEURDGO\FRPSDUDEOH OHYHOVWR
2007-13 in both absolute and per capita terms. 
Last, in the 2014-20 MFF proposals, the additional funding for Outermost Regions (OMR) and Low 
Population Density (LPD) areas was presented as a separate strand; this was not done in the 2007-
0))7KHVHUHJLRQVDSSHDUDVVLJQLILFDQWµZLQQHUV¶IURPWKHQHJRWLDWLRQSURFHVVZLWKWKHDOORFDWLRQ
increasing by around 50 percent on the original proposals. In practice, however, the aid intensity is 
still significantly lower for 2014-20 than in 2007-ZKHQDLGLQWHQVLW\ZDVVOLJKWO\RYHU¼SHUKHDG 
per annum (2011 prices). 
4.2 Spatial coverage 
In some respects the spatial coverage for 2014-20 represents continuity with, rather than change 
from, 2007-13. This is true of the designation criteria for the Cohesion Fund and the LDR, which 
remain the same; thH0'5FDWHJRU\UHWDLQVWKHµUHVLGXDO¶FKDUDFWHURIWKH5HJLRQDOFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV
and employment (RCE) areas, but is rigidly defined in terms GDP criteria. 
4.2.1 Structural Funds 
The outcomes for Structural Funds coverage are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. As in 2007-13, the 
entire EU is covered (in contrast with the pre-2007 period); however, there are significant differences 
between the two periods in the definition of transition regions.  
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Figure 1: Less Developed, Transition and More Developed Regions 2014-20 
Note: The map shows the NUTS 2006 boundaries for NUTS 2. NUTS 2010 altered the NUTS 2 boundaries for 
Finland. Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Under point 32 of the 7-8 February Council Conclusions (see 
footnote 19), where NUTS 2 regions had been merged under NUTS 2010 and where this led to a change in 
classification, Member States had the option to use the NUTS 2010 classification. This applied to Finland where 
eastern Finland would have had Transition status under the NUTS 2006, but where the NUTS 2010 classification 
was used. This enabled this part of Finland to benefit from the provisions for sparsely-populated regions under 
the More developed region strand ² see below. 
Source: DG Regio.  
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Figure 2: Assisted area coverage (% of population) 
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data, Fiche 12 and DG Regio (see footnote 10 above). 
The criteria for defining the Less-Developed Regions (LDR) are essentially the same as for the 
Convergence regions in 2007-13, save for the shift in benchmark to EU27. However, there are some 
significant changes in coverage between the two periods. In particular: 
x coverage falls from 31.7 percent of EU27 to 25.4 percent of EU28; 
x Germany ceases to have any LDR regions; 
x in Spain, coverage is significantly reduced (Extremadura only); 
x Malta loses Convergence status;  
x in Poland, Romania and Slovenia, the capital city regions not only lose Convergence status 
but are classified as More Developed Regions; and 
x Croatia has LDR status in its entirety, following a reconfiguration of the NUTS 2 regions; it 
would otherwise have had part LDR and part TR status. 
The criteria for so-called Transition Regions (TR) are markedly different from 2007-13. Whereas for 
2007-13 transitional arrangements were made with reference to the status of a region in the previous 
funding period, under the 2014-20 texts, TR are defined as regions where GDP(PPS) per head is 
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between 75 percent and 90 percent of the EU27 average, irrespective of whether the region had 
Convergence status in 2007-13. Overall, TR cover 13.5 percent of the EU28 population, but the 
eligible regions are heavily concentrated in certain countries, notably Germany, Spain, France and the 
United Kingdom, which account for the bulk of the TR population. Within some countries ± Malta, 
Belgium, Greece± TR coverage is significant (see Figure 2). 
As noted, the More-Developed Region (MDR) category retains the residual character of its 
predecessor, RCE. Importantly, however, it includes four regions which had Convergence status in 
2007-13 ± namely Galicia (ES), the Warsaw region Mazowieckie (PL), Bucharesti-Ilfov (RO) and the 
Ljubljana region, Zahodna Slovenija (SI). A significant change is that loss of Convergence status is 
handled through safety nets in the allocation mechanism with transition region designation.  
4.2.2 Cohesion Fund 
As in 2007-13, eligibility for the Cohesion Fund in 2014-20 is restricted to Member States where 
GNI(PPS) per head is less than 90 percent of the EU average; the only change is that eligibility is 
based on EU27 (in spite of enlargement to EU28). The changes in coverage for the 2014-20 period 
are that Cyprus loses eligibility and Croatia qualifies for the Cohesion Fund following accession.  
Figure 3: Cohesion Fund eligibility 2014-20 
 
Source: DG Regio. 
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4.3 Financial allocation mechanisms 
Financial allocations for Cohesion policy comprise three main elements. First, there are specific 
methodologies for allocating the sums under each strand of policy (LDR, TR, MDR, CF. OMR/LPD). 
Second, a series of adjustments is made in the form of capping, safety nets, floors and ceilings. Third, 
WKHUH DUH SURYLVLRQV WR DGGUHVV µVSHFLDO VLWXDWLRQV¶ WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH <RXWK (PSOR\PHQW ,QLWLDWLYH
which was added late in the negotiations, with an allocation methodology of its own, and unaffected 
by capping. 
4.3.1 Allocations 
(i) Less-Developed Regions 
From the outset, the Commission proposal implied the retention of the basic principles underpinning 
allocations to Less-Developed Regions (LDR) ± the so-FDOOHGµ%HUOLQIRUPXOD¶ 23 In particular: 
x the regional allocation LVEDVHGRQ WKH µJDS¶EHWZHHQ*'3336SHUFDSLWD LQ WKHHOLJLEOH
regions and the EU average; 
x the allocation (in euros) is calculated as percentage of that gap, the percentage varying 
according to national prosperity; 
x an unemployment premium is added for each unemployed person in excess of the LDR 
average rate. The 2007-0))DOORFDWHG¼SHUDQQXPSHUSHUVRQXQHPSOR\HGin excess 
RIWKH&RQYHUJHQFHUHJLRQDYHUDJHUDWH,QWKH&RPPLVVLRQSURSRVDOWKLVZDVUDLVHGWR¼
in line with inflation. The negotiations resulted in a substantial upgrading of the premium ± to 
¼SHUDQQXPSHUSHUVRQXQHPSOR\HGLQH[FHVVRIWKH&Rnvergence region average rate. 
In addition, the Commission had proposed an urban premium calculated as a per capita allocation for 
WKH SRSXODWLRQ RI FLWLHV ZLWK SRSXODWLRQ H[FHHGLQJ  DW ¼ SHU KHDG SHU DQQXP 7KLV ZDV
dropped during the Cyprus Presidency.24 
Regarding the national prosperity coefficient, as Table 5 shows, the Commission proposals retained 
WKH µEDQGLQJ¶ IURP WKH FXUUHQW SHULRG DOWKRugh enlargement means that these bands are slightly 
different.25 The proposed coefficients also differed, with the Commission proposing lower rates across 
the board, but (proportionately) less of a reduction in the least prosperous Member States, albeit with 
no apparent logic to the reduction. Importantly, these bands were the subject of intense negotiations 
with the result that the middle group of regions improved their allocations significantly while the most 
and least prosperous regions saw further reductions in relation to the Commission proposal. 
The LDR allocations are subject to capping. 
                                                 
23
 Presidency (2012) Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-2020) ± Section of the Negotiating Box Relating to 
Heading 1, Doc. 7635/12, 12 June: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st07/st07635.en12.pdf. 
24
 Presidency (2012) Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-20) ± Negotiating Box, Doc. 15599/12, 29 October: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st15/st15599.en12.pdf 
25
 Note that in 2007-13 the banding was changed to reflect enlargement. In the original Berlin formula which 
applied to 2000-6, the bands were 75 percent and 90 percent of the EU15 average. 
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Table 5: National prosperity coefficients 2007-13 and 2014-20 
2007-13 COM Proposals 2014-20 Council Concs 2014-20 
GNI 




EU27=100 Member State 
Coeff 
(%) Coeff (%) 
<82 CZ EE EL LV LT HU MT PL PT SI SK 4.25 <82 
BG CZ EE LV LT 
HU PL PT RO SK 3.3 3.15 
<99 ES 3.36 <99 EL SI 2.1 2.7 
>99 DE FR IT UK 2.67 >99 ES FR IT UK 1.7 1.65 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11July 2006, OJ L210/25; Presidency (2012) Multiannual 
Financial Framework (2014-2020), Doc 7635/12; European Council 7/8 February 2013, Conclusions (Multiannual 
Financial Framework) EUCO 37/13. 
(ii) Transition Regions 
The calculation of the TR allocation is complicated. The per capita allocation for each Transition 
Region (TR) is calculated with reference to a theoretical maximum intensity and a minimum intensity. 
The maximum intensity is based on the method for LDR. The formula assumes a region with GDP of 
75 percent of the EU average, applies the LDR method outlined above, including the national 
prosperity coefficient (see Table 5) then takes 40 percent of the amount obtained by this method as 
the maximum. The percentage rate used to calculate the maximum intensity was the subject of 
LQWHQVH QHJRWLDWLRQ DQG ZDV ORZHUHG IURP WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V LQLWLDO SURSRVDO RI  SHrcent. The 
minimum intensity is the average aid intensity in the MDR for that Member State.26  
The actual aid intensity for each TR depends on the prosperity of the region and is calculated through 
D µOLQHDU LQWHUSRODWLRQ¶ RI UHJLRQDO *'3 SHU KHDG DORQJ VFDle from the minimum and maximum 
FDOFXODWHG DV RXWOLQHG DERYH 7KLV PHDQV WKDW WKH FORVHU D UHJLRQ¶V *'3 WR  SHUFHQW RI WKH (8
average, the closer the aid intensity of the TR will be to that of the MDR in that country. An 
XQHPSOR\PHQWSUHPLXPRI¼SHU annum is added for each unemployed person in excess of the 
/'5DYHUDJHUDWH7KH&RPPLVVLRQSURSRVDOKDGEHHQIRUWKHXQHPSOR\PHQWSUHPLXPWREH¼,Q
addition, a specific safety net is applied to ensure that no TR receive less than it would have had it 
been a MDR. This was added late on in the negotiations and necessitated by the fact that the rate to 
calculate the maximum intensity was reduced from 75 percent to 40 percent, with the risk that TR 
allocations could be lower than MDR allocations ± as would indeed have been the case for some 
regions in Germany, Italy, Finland and the United Kingdom.27 
$QXUEDQSUHPLXPRI¼SHUKHDGSHUDQQXPKDGDOVREHHQSURSRVHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQEXWDVIRU
the LDR, this was dropped under the Cyprus Presidency. 
Like the LDR, TR allocations are also subject to capping. 
 
                                                 
26
 Before any regional safety net is applied. Note, however, that there is no national MRD figure to apply in the 
case of Malta. 
27
 According to EPRC calculations. 
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(iii) More-Developed Regions 
The MDR methodology is similar to that for 2007-13. It is based on an initial financial envelope set on 
a per capita basis - ¼SHUKHDGRIHOLJLEOHSRSXODWLRQSHUDQQXP7KLVJLYes an initial budget of 
¼ELOOLRQ IRU-20. The Commission had originally proposed the initial per capita amount as 
¼SHUDQQXPZKLFKZRXOGKDYH\LHOGHGDEXGJHWRIDERXW¼ELOOLRQIRU-20. 
As for 2007-13, this initial sum is distributed on the basis of a key (see Table 6 ). The criteria 
proposed for 2014-20 differ from those used in 2007-13, and place less emphasis on total population, 
more on employment rates and significantly more on educational attainment, reflecting Europe 2020 
priorities. However, direct comparisons between the two periods are complicated by the adjustments 
made to RCE allocations in respect of GDP and Objective 2 commitment appropriations in 2000-6. 
Table 6: Criteria and weightings for MDR financial allocations 2014-20 
Criterion Weight (%) 
Total MDR population 25.0 
Number of unemployed people in NUTS 2 regions with an unemployment rate above 
the average of all the more-developed regions 
20.0 
Employment to be added to reach the Europe 2020 target for regional  20.0 
Number of people aged 30 to 34 with tertiary educational attainment to be added to 
reach the Europe 2020 target of 40 percent 
12.5 
Number of early leavers from education and training (aged 18 to 24) to be subtracted 
to reach the Europe 2020 target of 10 percent 
12.5 
Difference between the observed GDP(PPS) of the region and the theoretical regional 
GDP if the region had the same GDP per head as the most prosperous NUTS 2 
region 
7.5 
Population of NUTS 3 regions with a population density of below 12.5 inhabitants per 
km2 
2.5 
Source: European Council 7/8 February 2013, Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework) EUCO 37/13. 
For 2014-20, the initial share of the MDR allocation for each Member State is the sum of the shares of 
its eligible regions. These are determined on the basis of the criteria and weightings shown in Table 6. 
In passing, it is worth noting that the quality of the data relating to tertiary educational attainment and 
early leavers is extremely poor. Neither data set is available in Eurostat at NUTS 2, and although 
some information is published in DG Regio Country Factsheets it is incomplete.28 This raises a 
general issue about whether data of such poor quality (or unpublished data) should carry a 25 percent 
weighting in determining the allocation of MDR funding. 
As for the LDR and TR, the Commission had initially proposed an urban premium, but again this was 
not retained.  
Unlike LDR and TR, MDR allocations are not subject to capping. 
                                                 
28
 See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/brochures/pages/country2012/index_en.cfm 
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(iv) European Territorial Cooperation 
European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) allocations are determined by a distribution key. This is based 
on the share of border regions in each Member State and its share of total population. The weighting 
given to each is determined by the share of the cross-border and transnational strands in the total 
ETC budget, this being set at 77.9 percent and 22.1 percent respectively. 
ETC allocations are not subject to capping. 
(v) Outermost, sparsely-populated regions and islands 
Allocations to the Outermost regions and the northern sparsely-populated regions are based on a per 
capita amount and are in addition to any allocation under the relevant designated area strand (i.e. 
LDR, TR, MDR). In the 2007-13 period this amounted to abRXW ¼ SHU KHDG SHU DQQXP DW 
SULFHV 7KH &RPPLVVLRQ SURSRVHG DQ DOORFDWLRQ RI ¼ SHU KHDG SHU DQQXP WKLV ZDV QHJRWLDWHG
XSZDUGV WR¼ LQ WKHFRXUVHRI WKHQHJRWLDWLRQVEXW WKLV LVVWLOO VXEVWDQWLDOO\EHORZ WKH LQWHQVLW\ LQ
2007-13. 
(vi) Cohesion Fund 
As for 2007-13, in 2014-20 there is an initial distribution of Cohesion Fund monies on the basis of a 
µWKHRUHWLFDO HQYHORSH¶ 7KH LQLWLDO WKHRUHWLFDO HQYHORSH LV FDOFXODWHG DV ¼ SHU DQQXP SHU KHDG RI
HOLJLEOH SRSXODWLRQ ZKLFK DPRXQWV WR ¼ PLOOLRQ for 2014-20; the Commission had proposed a 
WKHRUHWLFDOHQYHORSHEDVHGRQ¼SHUKHDGSHUDQQXP 
The criteria for the distribution of the theoretical envelope are unchanged from 2007-13. This takes 
the form of an allocation key based on national shares of population and surface area, adjusted for 
prosperity. As in 2014-20, the Cohesion Fund is to account for one-third of total Structural and 
Investment Fund allocations for Member States which joined the EU after 1 May 2004. As a result, 
only the Cohesion Fund allocations for Portugal and Greece are actually determined by the 
distribution key ± for the other eligible countries, Cohesion Fund allocations are determined by the 
interplay of the one-third rule with the provisions on capping, ceilings and safety nets. 
Transitional arrangements are made for Member States losing Cohesion Fund eligibility - as noted, 
only Cyprus. This is set as per capita amount - ¼SHUKHDGLQ - that tapers to zero over the 
period to 2020.  
Cohesion Fund allocations are subject to capping. 
4.3.2 Adjustments 
The allocations resulting from the above methodologies are subject to a series of adjustments. 
(i) Capping  
Capping Cohesion policy allocations as a proportion of GDP ± WKHµDEVRUSWLRQFDS¶- was in principle 
applied to all Member States in 2007-13. In practice it applied only to nine of the EU12 (all except 
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Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia) and none of the EU15.29 The level of capping was calibrated to national 
levels of GDP and, among the countries affected, ranged from 3.7893 percent of GDP in Latvia to 
3.4293 percent of GDP in the Czech Republic. Capping was applied to the annual allocations for the 
whole period on the basis of GDP forecasts. 
For 2014-20 the Commission proposed a single capping rate of 2.5 percent of forecast GDP per 
annum. This was also the subject of intense negotiations which resulted in two absorption caps: (i) a 
general one set at 2.35 percent (i.e. even lower than that proposed by the Commission); and (ii) what 
PLJKW EH WHUPHG D µORZ-JURZWK¶ FDS IRU 0HPEHU 6WDWHV MRLning the EU before 2013 (i.e. excluding 
Croatia), and where average real GDP growth in 2008-10 was less than -SHUFHQW7KLVµORZJURZWK¶
cap was set at 2.59 percent of GDP. In 2014-20, eight of the same Member States remain affected by 
capping, together ZLWK&URDWLDZKLOHWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFFHDVHVWREHFDSSHG7KHµORZJURZWK¶FDS
applies to Hungary and the three Baltic States.30 
(ii) &HLOLQJVµUHYHUVHVDIHW\QHW¶ 
For 2014-20, Cohesion policy allocations are also limited by an overall ceiling on national allocations 
expressed as a percentage of 2007-13 allocations ± WKLVZDVVRPHWLPHVWHUPHGDµUHYHUVHVDIHW\QHW¶
and was designed to constrain spend notably in countries where growth had been high (so the cap bit 
at higher levels) but which retained significant LDR coverage and Cohesion Fund status. This 
PHFKDQLVPZDVQRWLQFOXGHGLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQLWLDOSURSRVDOVEXW it was floated in the Denmark 
Presidency31 and introduced in concrete terms in the first of the van Rompuy negotiating boxes. This 
proposed that 2014-20 allocations should not exceed 115 percent of 2007-13 allocations, but the 
figure was reduced to 110 percent in the Council Conclusions. In practice, the ceiling applies to 
Romania and Slovakia.32 
(iii) National safety net 
Conversely, the Council Conclusions provide for a national safety net of 55 percent of the 2007-13 
DOORFDWLRQ 7KLV SURYLVLRQ ZDV LQFOXGHG LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V LQLWLDO SURSRVDOV DQG LV RQH RI WKH IHZ
elements of those proposals to emerge unchanged from the negotiations. Cyprus was the sole 
beneficiary of the safety net.33 
(iv) Regional safety set for former Convergence regions  
A specific safety net is applied to regions which do not have LDR status in 2014-20, but which were 
Convergence regions in 2007-13. This is set at 60 percent of their indicative annual allocation under 
the Convergence objective; the Commission had initially proposed that this safety net should be set at 
two-thirds. This was designed, in particular, to deal with situations where regions are losing 
Convergence status and becoming MDR. 
                                                 
29




 Presidency (2012) Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-2020), Doc 8966/12, 30 March, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st08/st08966.en12.pdf  
32
 According to EPRC calculations. 
33
 Ibid. 
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4.3.3 Special arrangements 
Two further sets of measures completed the financial package for Cohesion policy concluded by the 
Council in February. First, a number of disparate provisions were made for countries and regions 
considered to be insufficiently catered for by the general framework, all of which involve additional 
allocations. Second, the Youth Employment Initiative, which is not affected by capping, was added 
ZLWKDQDGGLWLRQDOEXGJHWRI¼ELOOLRQ 
(i) Special allocation provisions 
Various special provisions were justified by the need to provide extra funds to countries particularly 
affected by the crisis within the euro-area, to recognise the challenges facing island Member States 
and the remoteness of certain regions and to facilitate the adjustment of certain regions to changes in 
their stats or to the long-term impact of recent economic developments. In addition, an allocation of 
¼PLOOLRQZDVPDGHWR3($&( 
Table 7µ6SHFLDODOORFDWLRQSURYLVLRQV¶¼PLOOLRQV2011 prices 
Member States affected by the crisis in the euro area ¼P 
GR: all for MDR 1375 
37¼PIRU0'5¼PIRU0DGHLUD¼PIRU75DQG¼PIRU/'5 1000 
IE: for Border, Midlands and West region 100 
(6RIZKLFK¼PIRU([WUHPDGXUD 1824 
,7IRU/'5RIZKLFK¼PIRUQRQ-urban areas 1500 
Island situations and remoteness 
 
MT: in addition to the national safety net, and of which one-third for the Cohesion Fund 200 
CY: in addition to the national safety net, and of which one-third for the Cohesion Fund 150 
ES: for Ceuta and Melilla 50 
FR: for Mayotte 200 




HU: for LDR and notwithstanding capping 1560 
&=IRU/'5DQGRIZKLFK¼PWREHWUDQVIHUUHGIURPWKH&=UXUDOGHYHORSPHQWDOORFDWLRQ 900 
SI: for LDR 75 
PEACE 
 
UK, IE 150 
Total 9927 
 
(ii) Youth Employment Initiative 
The last van Rompuy negotiating box introduced the concept of a Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). 
7KHWRWDOYDOXHRIWKH<(,LV¼ELOOLRQEXWRQO\KDOIRIWKLVLVDGGLWLRQDOWKHUHPDLQGHULVWREHULQJ-
fenced through targeted European Social Fund investment. The YEI is available to NUTS 2 regions 
where youth unemployment in 2012 exceeds 25 percent and the allocation is based on the number of 
young unemployed people in these regions. The impact of the YEI is discussed below, but it is worth 
noting that around one-third of the allocation would appear to be accounted for by Spain. 
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4.4 Outcomes 
The crucial issue is what impact the interplay of these various mechanisms has on funding allocations 
at the national (and ultimately subnational) level. In late August 2013 the Commission published a 
breakdown by Member State for all strands of Cohesion policy, except the Youth Employment 
Initiative. This is replicated in Table 8 along with EPRC estimates for the YEI. 
Table 8: Cohesion policy allocations by Member State 2014-¼PSULFHV 
 
Cohesion 
Fund LDR TR 
OMR & 





865 230 33 2,087 
BG 2,376 4,607 
   
145 60 7,188 
CZ 6,539 13,599 
  















EE 1,119 2,190 





    
866 148 71 1,084 
GR 3,396 6,398 2,097 
 
2,299 203 159 14,551 
ES 
 
1,851 11,735 430 10,471 540 1,026 26,054 
FR 
 





6,982 994 358 29,596 
CY 285 




LV 1,407 2,732 
   
82 40 4,261 
LT 2,137 4,175 
   
99 52 6,464 
LU 




HU 6,291 13,405 
  




















PL 24,189 45,756 
  
2,010 613 178 72,746 
PT 2,990 14,956 231 103 1,144 107 149 19,680 
RO 7,226 13,724 
  
403 396 136 21,886 





SK 4,346 8,459 
  
40 195 84 13,124 
FI 
   




   





5,126 757 354 10,682 
HR 2,667 5,206 




Total 66,130 163,704 31,550 1,382 49,336 8,419 3,000 323,520 
Note: 7KHVHILJXUHVH[FOXGHDOORFDWLRQVWRLQWHUUHJLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ¼PDQG7HFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFH¼P
which are not disaggregated by Member State. 
Source: Inforegio ± see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/future/eligibility/index_en.cfm and EPRC 
calculations for the distribution of the Youth employment Initiative (and adjusted totals).  
As would be expected, this distribution represents considerable continuity; Poland, for example, 
continuing to be the single largest beneficiary of the funds. On the other hand, while some have 
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increased their share of spend (Poland, Romania and Italy), Others see a reduction (Spain, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Czech Republic). Moreover, these reduced shares are in the context of a smaller 
overall budget. 
Figure 4: National shares of Cohesion policy funding in 2007-13 and 2014-20 
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4.4.1 How did countries fare in the Cohesion policy budget negotiations? 
An interesting question is how countries fared in the Cohesion policy negotiations, not least as these 
UHVXOWHG LQ D FXW RI ¼ ELOOLRQ LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V RULJLQDO SODQV ,Q SUDFWLFH WKH LPSDFW RI WKH
negotiations is not easy to assess ± mainly because the Commission never releases data on its 
proposed national allocations before or during the negotiations. Nevertheless, it is possible estimate 
the national allocations based on the initial proposal34 (though the figures should be treated with 
caution) and to compare these with the final outcomes.  
Figure 5: Impact of the negotiations on the Commission proposals (% change) 
 
Source: EPRC calculations 
Figure 5 estimates the change in allocations between the Commission proposals and the outcome 
agreed at the Council meeting of 7-8 February 2013. In general, this suggests that some relatively 
small less prosperous Member States were able to improve their positions at the expense of some 
more prosperous ones (and some large less prosperous ones, notably Poland and Romania. Cyprus 
increased its allocation by the largest amount in relative terms (over 40 percent), but the increase 
DPRXQWVWROHVVWKDQ¼PLOOLRQ,n absolute terms, WKHELJJHVWµZLQQHUV¶IURPWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVZHUH
+XQJDU\ DQG *UHHFH ZKLFK VHFXUHG LQFUHDVHV LQ H[FHVV RI ¼ ELOOLRQ LQ UHODWLRQ WR ZKDW WKH
Commission had proposed (but this was much lower than what these countries had received in 2007-
13).35 $W WKHRWKHUHQGRI WKHVSHFWUXP3RODQGDQG5RPDQLD µORVW¶DOPRVW¼ELOOLRQDQGDURXQG¼
billion, respectively, through the negotiation process; as will be seen, however, in relation to 2007-13, 
both made absolute gains. Germany, France and the United Kingdom also saw their allocations 
UHGXFHGIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQLWLDOSURSRVDOV± E\DURXQG¼ELOOLRQWR¼ELOOLRQ 
                                                 
34
 See Mendez, C, Wishlade, F. and Bachtler, J (2012) Negotiating Boxes and Blocks: Crafting a Deal on the EU 
Budget and Cohesion Policy, EoRPA paper 12/4.  
35





















T LV EE IE P
T



















Absolute change % Change
A new dawn for Cohesion policy? The emerging budgetary and policy directions for 2014-20 
EoRPA Paper 13/4 30 European Policies Research Centre 
4.4.2 How do allocations compare with 2007-13? 
Perhaps more important than the impact of the negotiations on the Commission proposals are the 
differences between current (ie. 2007-13) and future funding (2014-20). These are illustrated in Figure 
6 which shows that the impact of the budget settlement varies widely between countries.  
In six countries there is an increase in funding in 2014-20 compared with 2007-13. In relative terms 
Ireland gains most with a 16 percent increase on current allocations. However, in absolute terms this 
iV UDWKHU PRGHVW DQG UHSUHVHQWV RQO\ DURXQG ¼ PLOOLRQ %\ FRQWUDVW WKUHH FRXQWULHV JDLQ
VLJQLILFDQWO\LQDEVROXWHWHUPVLQ3RODQGDOORFDWLRQVLQFUHDVHE\¼ELOOLRQZKLOHWKRVHLQ5RPDQLD
LQFUHDVHE\¼ELOOLRQDQGWKRVHLQ6ORYDNLDE\¼ELOOLRQ 
Figure 6: Changes in financial allocations from 2007-13 to 2014-20 
 
Source: EPRC calculations. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, there are very significant reductions in expenditure both in 
absolute and relative terms in a number of countries. These include Spain and Germany which each 
ORVH LQ H[FHVV RI ¼ ELOOLRQ LQ &RKHVLRQ SROLF\ UHFHLSWV HTXLYDOHQW WR ZHOO RYHU D TXDUWHU RI WKHLU
current allocations. It is also noteworthy that Greece and Hungary also see major reduction in their 
allocations, even though these two countries did well from the negotiations (see Figure 5); in other 
words, although comparatively successful in the negotiations, they were unable to clawback the 
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4.4.3 What explains these changes? 
The diverse outcomes shown in the above charts are due the interplay of a number of different factors 
in the underlying methodoORJLHVWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHLPSDFWRIWKHµRWKHUVSHFLDODOORFDWLRQSURYLVLRQV¶ 
Germany, Slovenia, Greece, Spain and Malta are all affected by substantial reductions in - or 
complete loss of - LDR coverage which accounted for much of their previous allocations. Most of the 
UHJLRQV FRQFHUQHG EHFRPH 75 DQG DOO DUH DQ\ZD\ VXEMHFW WR D µVDIHW\ QHW¶ RI  SHUFHQW RI WKHLU
previous allocations, but this still represents a substantial reduction. In the Czech Republic there are 
no changes in LDR coverage, but because per capita aid intensities for LDR are cut (by between 20 
and 38 percent, depending on national prosperity ± see Table 5) so too are LDR allocations. This 
applies to all other countries not affected by capping, so has an impact on Italy, France, Portugal, 
Greece, Spain, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.  
For eight countries, capping continues to determine allocations. The Council conclusions set capping 
at 2.35 percent of GDP in general, and 2.59 percent for countries where the economy shrank by more 
than 1 percent in 2008-10. This level of capping is much lower than the previous sliding scale (which 
went up to almost 3.8 percent of GDP). However, for countries which have grown fast, even the lower 
capping rate does not prevent allocations rising ± this is true for Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Poland. On the other hand, for countries which have not grown significantly, capping bites at lower 
levels than before (a smaller percentage of a stagnant GDP), even allowing for the higher cap rate for 
µORZ JURZWK¶ FRXQWULHV 7KLV DFFRXQWV IRU WKH UHGXFHG DOORFDWLRQV IRU +XQJDU\ DQG WKH WKUHH %DOWLF
states ± arguably a somewhat perverse outcome since it could be argued that countries that had 
failed to prosper were more in need of support. 
Belgium, France and the United Kingdom are the main beneficiaries of the TR strand insofar as it 
concerns regions which did not previously have Convergence status. Without this, these countries 
would have seen greater reductions in allocation and the reductions are modest compared with other 
countries of comparable prosperity. Interestingly, however, the small overall decrease for the United 
Kingdom conceals a significant reduction in allocations for the LDR regions owing to the changes in 
the national prosperity coefficient mentioned above. 
)RUVRPHFRXQWULHVWKH µRWKHUVSHFLDODOORFDWLRQSURYLVLRQV¶DQGWKH<RXWK(PSOR\PHQW,QLWLDWLYHDUH
decisive. In Ireland, for example, the increase on previous coverage is due to these additional 
allocations, without which Ireland would have seen a reduction in allocations compared to 2007-13; 
the same applies to Italy, which also gained under special allocations and YEI. Elsewhere, although 
there were substantial special allocations, these were not sufficient to mitigate overall losses; as in the 
cases of Portugal, Greece and Spain. 
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5. COHESION POLICY 2014-20: PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS AND 
OPERATIONAL PROGRAMMES 
5.1 State-of-play of Partnership Agreements 
Considerable progress has been made in the development of the Partnership Agreements (PAs) 
during 2013. Extensive inter-governmental consultation and coordination within and across different 
levels of government has been taking place in all Member States, and public consultations have been 
organised or finalised in some cases. Ex-ante evaluations of the PA have been launched in some 
countries, where governments have chosen to do this at both PA and programme level (e.g. 
Germany, Poland, United Kingdom). Progress with the drafting the PAs is variable across EU 
countries. Many countries had developed full drafts of their PAs and sent or discussed them informally 
with the Commission before the summer recess, although the Commission noted that 12 Member 
States needed to make additional efforts to progress preparations (AT, BG, HR, CY, DE, FR, ES, IE, 
IT, NL, PT and UK).36 The aim in most cases is to formally submit the PA to the Commission by the 
end of the year. A summary of progress with the development of the PAs in each EoRPA country is 
provided below. 
x Austria: The preparation process of the Austrian PA was launched in April 2012 at the first 
STRAT.AT 2020 forum. A so-FDOOHG µH[SHUWSDSHU¶ZDVSUHVHQWHG LQ-XO\DQGDSXEOLF
consultation ran until September 2012. Between November 2012 and February 2013 15 
WKHPDWLF µIRFXV JURXSV¶ LQYROYLQJ D ZLGH UDQJH RI DFWRUV ORRNHG DW VSHFLILF WKHPHV UDQJLQJ
IURP57', WRSRYHUW\DQG WKHXUEDQGLPHQVLRQ7KHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI WKH3$¶V ILUVWGUDIWZDV
initially planned for March, but has been postponed to 18 June. The main reason for delays 
ZLWK WKH 3$ GUDIW ZDV WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI WKH µ'UDIW 7HPSODWH IRU WKH 0DLQ (OHPHQWV RI WKH
3DUWQHUVKLS&RQWUDFW¶RQ1RYHPEHUIROORZHGE\WKHUHYLVHGYHUVLRQRQ)HEUXDU\ 
A first public draft was presented at a STRAT.AT 2020 forum on 18 June 2013, which marked 
the launch of a second public online consultation running until 31 July 2013. For this, the draft 
text was split into 389 statements, which could be voted on by userVXVLQJDVLPSOHµWKXPEV
XS¶µWKXPEVGRZQ¶V\VWHP$OVRLWDOORZHGHQWHULQJFRPPHQWVRQHDFKSRLQWUHJLVWHUHG
users made use of these options. The website also allowed position papers to be uploaded: 
12 stakeholders made use of this. ÖROK will publish a summary and assessment of the 
consultation results in the course of September. The finalisation and submission of the PA to 
the Commission is planned for autumn. 
 
x Finland: The Ministry of Employment and the Economy and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry are responsible for preparing the Finnish Partnership Agreement for 2014-20. 
Approval of the Partnership Agreement and OP by the Finnish government was planned for 
June/July 2013 and the aim was to submit both documents to the Commission in one block in 
August 2013. The preparations of the Finnish Partnership Agreement have progressed well 
and the first internal draft of the Partnership Agreement was completed in April 2013. Aspects 
of the preparation of the Finnish Partnership Agreement are being discussed in the regular 
meetings that bring together the managing authorities of CSF Funds. There is some 
                                                 
36
 European Commission (2013) EU Cohesion policy contributing to employment and growth in Europe, Joint 
paper from the Directorates-General for Regional & Urban Policy and Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, 
European Commission, Brussels. 
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uncertainty over timing in Finland due to delays in agreeing the EAFRD and EMFF budgets at 
EU level, which could delay submission of the Partnership Agreement to the Commission. 
 
x France: The Partnership Agreement is still at a very early stage. Following a consultation 
process, a reporting back seminar took place on 9 July 2013 in the framework of a political 
event, bringing together ministers and Commissioner Hahn. Some major issues remain to be 
dealt with, notably issues linked to the distribution of regional allocations. Since the OPs 
constitute the main input to the PA and are still being developed, only a broad outline of the 
PA was presented in the form of a 7-page document. In order to progress the PA, the national 
coordination body DATAR will have to wait for the inputs of the regional councils. The final PA 
will be finalised by the beginning of November 2013.  
 
x Germany: The Federal Ministry for the Economy and Innovation (BMWI) is responsible for 
coordinating PA preparations. Much of the content will be constructed from the bottom-up 
based on 50 programmes. Regular meetings are being held at various levels: Group of 
Ministers for the Economy or the Group of Land Presidents; operational meetings bringing 
together senior staff from the BMWI, other relevant federal ministries and the Land-level 
managing authorities; focus groups set up around the key priority axes that most Länder wish 
to fund; and ad hoc operational-level meetings between BMWI staff and other individual 
authorities on specific issues. A stronger effort has been made to involve a broader range of 
partners in the programming workshops and ad hoc meetings which has proved to be very 
positive and constructive for improving and drafting the strategy. The BMWI has a draft of the 
PA, which includes a broad strategy covering all Funds. Preparations are progressing well 
within given EU-OHYHOGHOD\VRQ WKHEXGJHWDQGDOVR WRDQH[WHQWGRPHVWLFDOO\7KH%XQG¶V
aim is to have a full draft of all the OPs and the PA by the end of June 2013, and to submit 
this to the Commission then.  
 
x Italy. A draft of the PA was prepared based on inter-institutional dialogue and consultations 
with socio-economic partners, in an open and inclusive process, with inputs from 
administrations at different territorial levels and from socio-economic partners and civil 
society. The preparations were structured by four thematic working groups, technical working 
JURXSVDQGRSHQHYHQWVDQGDZRUNLQJJURXSRQµ5XOHVDQGKRUL]RQWDO LVVXHV¶7KHFXUUHQW
version of the PA includes some indication of the national programmes that will be 
established and of the expected results and possible actions. Work on financial allocations to 
themes and priorities began in April and strategic thinking is well-advanced on key territorial 
themes relating to the Mezzogiorno, so-FDOOHGµ,QWHUQDODUHDV¶(sparsely populated with limited 
access to basic services) and cities. A first draft of the PA was sent to the European 
Commission on 9 April 2013 and the formal submission of the final version is scheduled for 
the end of September 2013. 
 
x Netherlands: A draft version of the Partnership Agreement was available before the summer 
and discussed at a stakeholder conference. The Partnership Agreements will be formally 
submitted to the Commission later than initially planned, which has been accepted by the 
Commission.  
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x Poland: The drafting and coordination of the PA has been led by the Ministry of Regional 
Development involving collaboration and consultation with a wide range of national and sub-
national Ministries and stakeholders. The key principles and programme architecture were 
decided in January 2013. The latest version was sent to the Commission in mid-June to 
continue informal discussions. The ex-ante evaluation, Strategic Environmental Assessment 
and public consultations should be finalised in September-October 2013, paving the way for 
formal submission of the PA to the Commission at the end of 2013.  
 
x Sweden: The Partnership Agreement is being developed simultaneously with the OPs, and is 
expected to be submitted to the Commission in October 2013. A draft version was published 
in early 2013 albeit without financial allocations. Following previous practice, another national 
strategy for regional development is being developed alongside the PA to underpin the 
strategy. 
 
x United Kingdom. The PA will be an overarching document with a separate chapter for 
England and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The 
United Kingdom document will be finalised in October 2013 and a draft will then be worked on 
with the Commission in November/December to be submitted at the end of 2013. Ex-ante 
evaluations of the United Kingdom PA and the different chapters have been commissioned 
and are underway. The English chapter will now reflect a new LEP (Local Enterprise 
Partnership) locally-driven model. A series of cross-government groups comprising relevant 
partners are developing the English chapter, and a national group (CSF England) brings 
together lead departments. In Scotland, the managing authority has been working on the 
Scottish chapter with stakeholders, rural and fisheries policy colleagues as well as colleagues 
from audit and finance departments of the Scottish Government. This work has been carried 
out in several groups around thematic objectives and meetings with the Commission have 
also been held. In Wales, the managing authority (WEFO) started developing the OPs before 
the Welsh chapter of the PA, following a reflections exercise. The PA chapter is currently 
being developed based on consultation and an independent review of future implementation 
arrangements.  
 
5.2 Financial allocations to Regions and Funds 
The Commission formally published the national allocations for each category of region in August 
2013, providing a basis for bilateral negotiations with the Member States on the allocations to regions 
and programmes. At the time of the fieldwork, very few Member States had engaged in discussions or 
contacts with the Commission on financial allocations and only on an informal basis (e.g. France, 
Poland). Nevertheless, the Member States have made calculations on the possible allocation of funds 
between programmes and regions and in some cases have proposed indicative allocations - internally 
in the cases of Austria and Germany, and publicly in Poland and the United Kingdom. A common goal 
informing these decisions is to ensure an equitable distribution of funding across regions that 
minimises abrupt changes relative to the previous period. 
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5.2.1 Regional allocations 
Based on the available information and interview research, a summary of the key issues and 
approach taken to regional allocations in several EoRPA countries is as follows. 
Austria  
The criteria for the distribution are currently under discussion but the goal is to distribute the expected 
loss of funding for Austria fairly amongst the Länder and to incorporate compensation 
mechanisms/safety nets. There have already been meetings between experts from the Länder and 
some thinking has been done about defining a minimum allocation per Land in order to create the 
necessary critical mass to allow for effective use of the Funds. A likely option is to increase the 
funding for Länder with smaller shares relative to larger ones. However, final decisions will depend on 
whether the Commission will make proposals for the distribution of funding within Member States as 
was the case for the 2007-13 programme period. More generally, there are concerns about a shift in 
the equity goals of Cohesion policy towards competitiveness goals, which may mean that GDP per 
capita criteria take on less importance when allocation of funds are decided. The ERDF funds will be 
allocated to the nine Länder, applying a series of criteria. Amongst these, the most important are the 
FXUUHQWOHYHORIIXQGLQJDQGPLQLPXPDOORFDWLRQVWRVPDOOHUµVXE-SURJUDPPHV¶Länder).  
Germany  
The German authorities have made their own calculations on the possible allocation of funds between 
programmes/regions, based on what is known about EU-level agreements (see Table 9). These 
calculations suggest two problems. First, they show a fall of 36 percent across all current 
Convergence and Phasing-out regions; this contrasts with the domestic agreement reached, namely 
that a safety net of 66 percent (of the level of 2007-13 funding) should apply to the German 
Convergence and Phasing-out regions in 2014-20. Second, they show much stronger falls in some 
regions than in others, with particularly strong falls in the one region (Brandenburg-Südwest) which is 
likely to shift from being a Phasing-out region to a Transition Region (-83 percent), as well as 
significant falls in those regions (Leipzig and Lüneburg which are likely to shift from being Phasing-out 
regions to More Developed Regions (-70 percent). The differential outcomes for Brandenburg-
Südwest and Leipzig are seen as particularly problematical, and are due to the text of paragraph 52 of 
WKH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLODJUHHPHQWRI)HEUXDU\ZKLFKSURYLGHVIRU µDGGLWLRQDOHQYHORSHV¶ IRU
ex-Convergence regions in Germany and for Leipzig but not for ex-Phasing-out regions. 
The main principles informing the approach in Germany are two-fold. First, the German authorities 
have decided that, in principle, there should be a safety net for each Land: For the current 
Convergence / Phasing-out Länder, no Land should receive less than 66 percent of its current SF 
funding; and for the current RCE / Phasing-in Länder, no Land should receive less than 85 percent of 
its current share of funding (i.e. 85 percent of its current share, not 85 percent of its current funding). 
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Table 9: *HUPDQ DXWKRULWLHV¶ FDOFXODWLRQV RI WKH SRVVLEOH DOORFDWLRQ RI (5')(6) IXQGLQJ






Percentage change in 
2014-20 compared to 
2007-13 
Total German ERDF & ESF 29.7 17.3 -35% 
Current Convergence and Phasing-out 
regions (combined) 12.9 8.3 -36% 
Current Phasing-out regions   -83% 
Current RCE and Phasing-in regions 
(combined) 9.6 7.2 -25% 
Source: German authorities 
Second, the Group of Ministers for the Economy is engaging in separate discussions on the domestic 
methods to be used for allocating funds between, on the one hand, the Convergence/Phasing-out 
Länder and, on the other, the RCE/Phasing-in Länder.  
x The eastern Länder are currently discussing different scenarios for the future Transition 
regions and, in particular, whether they would overall accept to shift some additional funds to 
Brandenburg-südwest and how this could be done.  
x In the case of the RCE regions, a broad agreement on the methodology for allocating funds 
between ERDF programmes was reached in December 2012 by the Group of Economy 
Ministers in the western Länder. The method is based largely on the COM indicators, but with 
a slightly different weighting i.e. it has an even stronger emphasis on population. The Group 
experimented with a number of different scenarios, one of which was the GRW (Regional 
Joint Task) model that favours structurally weaker regions; however, as the ERDF is no 
longer formally a redistributive instrument (Ausgleichsinstrument) from an EU perspective, the 
Group rejected this approach in favour of the COM approach in broad terms.  
x A further complicating factor for the Transition regions is that Leipzig (an eastern region which 
is likely to be a More Developed Region in 2014-20) could see a further increase in funding 
due to the domestic method that could be adopted for the RCE regions i.e. this method could 
include a bonus for structurally weaker More developed regions i.e. Leipzig. This would 
further widen the gap between Leipzig and Brandenburg-Südwest.  
Finland 
In the 2014-20 period, the number of programmes will change significantly as there will be only one 
national programme (combining ERDF and ESF) compared to five at present (four regional ERDF and 
one national ESF programme), although the national programme will have two regional plans (one 
plan for north and east, and another plan for south and west). The allocation of funding to the regional 
plans was done on the basis of a regional proposal. The proposal, which was approved by the 
Government, was developed in collaboration with the Regional Councils and the ELY-Centres. On the 
basis of this proposal, Eastern and Northern Finland are due to receive approximately 71 percent of 
the fXQGLQJHTXLYDOHQWRI¼PLOOLRQZKLOH:HVWHUQDQG6RXWKHUQ)LQODQGZLOOUHFHLYHSHUFHQW
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HTXLYDOHQWRI¼PLOOLRQ7KHLVODQGRIcODQGZLOOEHDOORFDWHGSHUFHQWHTXLYDOHQWRI¼PLOOLRQ
The national themes were allocated 10 percent of ERDF and 25 percent of ESF funding.37  
Netherlands 
There is an overall reduction of 30 percent in ERDF for the Netherlands, but a rise in ETC funds. This 
was expected and the Netherlands is content with the outcomes of the negotiations. No decision on 
regional allocations has been taken. To a large extent this is a political discussion but also regional 
differences in terms of economic growth and the effects of the crisis will be taken into account (both 
political and economic factors). A decision is expected in September 2013. The political debate for 
ERDF allocations of budgets at the regional level is influenced by other funding arrangements. 
Regional politicians look to the overall package of resources that their region receives and negotiate 
on that basis  
Poland  
According to the European Council agreement, the WRWDO DOORFDWLRQ IRU 3RODQG ZLOO EH DURXQG ¼
billion (in constant prices, 2011). The basic allocation is calculated taking into account the maximum 
limit that can be set under capping (designated for Poland at 2.35 percent of GDP). In addition, 
3RODQGZLOO UHFHLYHDSSUR[LPDWHO\¼PLOOLRQXQGHU WKH\RXWKXQHPSOR\PHQW LQLWLDWLYH7KLV will be 
an additional amount of a specific budget line - for regions at NUTS 2 level, where the unemployment 
rate of young people (aged 15-24 years) is above 25 percent. Within this basic allocation, the 
following transfers will be made to instruments and programs managed directly by the European 
Commission (Connecting Europe Facility, European Fund for Assistance to the most needy, technical 
assistance at the initiative of the Commission, innovative actions at the initiative of the European 
Commission). ThHVH WUDQVIHUV DUH GHGXFWHG IURP WKH DYDLODEOH DOORFDWLRQ IRU 3RODQG WRWDOOLQJ ¼
billion.  
)RU WKH ILUVW WLPH LQ 3RODQG IXQGLQJ ZLOO EH DOORFDWHG WR GLIIHUHQW FDWHJRULHV RI UHJLRQV WKH µOHVV
GHYHORSHG¶ DQG µPRUH GHYHORSHG¶ 0D]RZLHFNLH WKH UHJLRQ ZKHUH 3RODQG¶V FDSLWDO FLW\ :DUVDZ LV
located, has exceeded the 75 percent of GDP threshold and will become the first Polish region to 
PRYH IURP µ&RQYHUJHQFH¶ WR µPRUH GHYHORSHG¶ VWDWXV, which will impact on the level of support 
available. However, this shift is based on the performance of the capital city, which is a key driver of 
the regional and the national economy. The challenges of supporting a fundamental engine of 
regional and national growth and ensuring appropriate investment in the much less developed parts of 
the capital city region will require specific instruments. The allocation for Mazowieckie will be shared 
EHWZHHQUHJLRQDODQGQDWLRQDOOHYHOV2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHUHZLOOEHDµUHJLRQDOHQYHORSH¶FRYHUHGE\
the Mazowieckie regional OP. This will consist of a minimum of 60 percent of the ERDF funds for 
Mazowieckie and 75 percent RIWKH(6)IXQGV3RODQGZLOODOVRXWLOLVHWKHµIOH[LELOLW\PHFKDQLVP¶WKDW
will allow an additional three percent of the pool from the other 15 regions to be dedicated to 
0D]RZLHFNLH 7KLV ZLOO EH GRQH RQ D µSUR UDWD¶ EDVLV WKURXJK VR-FDOOHG µV\VWHPLF SURMHFWV¶ LQ 23
priorities. A detailed breakdown of the funds available under cohesion policy in the 2014-20 is 
presented in Table 10 below. 
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Total allocation before transfers 72,854 
    In this, resources in the framework of the youth employment initiative  181 
Basic allocation (without the youth employment initiative)  72,673 
Allocation after transfers (Cohesion Fund, European fund for the most 
needy, TA, Innovative Actions)  68,070 
     Objective 1 ± µ,QYHVWPHQWLQHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGHPSOR\PHQW¶ 67,586 
          Cohesion Fund 20,280 
          Structural Funds 47,306 
               Less developed regions 45,292 
               Mazowieckie 2,014 
      Objective 2 ± µ(XURSHDQ7HUULWRULDO&RRSHUDWLRQ¶ 485 
µ)OH[LELOLW\PHFKDQLVP¶± transferring 3 percent of resources within 
regional categories  1,359 
$OORFDWLRQDIWHUWUDQVIHUVDQGWKHµIOH[LELOLW\PHFKDQLVP¶ 68,070 
     Objective 1 ± µ,QYHVWPHQWLQHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGHPSOR\PHQW¶ 67,586 
          Cohesion Fund 20,280 
          Structural Funds 47,306 
                    ERDF 37,002 
                    ESF 10,304 
               less developed 43,933 
                    ERDF 34,363 
                    ESF 9,570 
               Mazowieckie 3,373 
                    ERDF 2,638 
                    ESF 735 
   Youth employment initiative 181 
   European fund for the most needy 425 
        Objective 2 ± µ(XURSHDQ7HUULWRULDO&RRSHUDWLRQ¶ 485 
[Concerning funding for CAP (Pillar 2) and the Fisheries Fund, there was a lack of information in June 2013 to 
allow calculations of allocation.] 
Source: Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2013) Programowanie perspektywy finansowej 2014 -2020 - 
Umowa Partnerstwa ± ZVWĊSQ\ SURMHNW -XQH  >3URJUDPPLQJ SHUVSHFWLYH -2020 ± Partnership 
Agreement ± (draft version), June 2013. 
United Kingdom  
The indicative breakdown of future ESIF funding between constituent parts of the UK was announced 
by the UK Government in March 2013. It was considered that EU formula for allocating Structural 
Funds would not have resulted in µVXGGHQDQGVLJQLILFDQWFXWEDFNVLQ1RUWhern Ireland, Scotland and 
:DOHV¶.  
The allocations announced were as follows:  
x Northern Ireland - DWRWDODOORFDWLRQRIDURXQG¼PLOOLRQDQXSOLIWRI¼PLOOLRQFRPSDUHG
to the amount that Northern Ireland would receive under the EU formula for allocation of the 
Funds to the UK; 
x Scotland - WRWDO IXQGLQJ RI DURXQG ¼ PLOOLRQ UHSUHVHQWLQJ DQ XSOLIW RI ¼ PLOOLRQ
compared to the amount that Scotland would receive under the EU formula; 
x Wales - WRWDODOORFDWLRQRIDURXQG¼EQ, representing DQXSOLIWRI¼PLOOLRQFRPSDUHGWR
the amount that Wales would receive under the EU formula; and 
x England - DWRWDODOORFDWLRQRI¼ELOOLRQ 
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This decision means that each Devolved Administration is only subject to an equal percentage cut of 
around 5 percent in funding compared to 2007-13 levels. Funding for the ETC objective and the Youth 
Employment Initiative will be subject to a separate process. Final allocations will be subject to the 
agreement on the EU regulations and the ongoing negotiation of the 2014-20 EU Budget; the 
&RPPLVVLRQPXVWDOVRDJUHHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSURSRVDOV 
A written Ministerial Statement to the UK Parliament in June 201338 announced the breakdowns within 
the DAs and at local level in England. 
x In England, the element retained by government for central programmes has been 
dramatically reduced from around 50 percent to under 5 percent so that maximum funds 
would go to local areas. Each of the 39 LEP areas has been given an allocation, made up of 
funds from ERDF and ESF. EAFRD allocations will be announced at a later date. The (nine) 
Transition Region allocations (and the fact that Cornwall is an LDR) within England would 
also have been a factor helping to pre-determine local allocations. 
x *LEUDOWDU¶VFXUUHQWDOORFDWLRQZLOOEH IUR]HQDW¼PLOOLRQDQGZLOOEH WDNHQ IURPWKH(QJODQG
allocation for MDRs (Gibraltar is counted in this category). 
x 6FRWODQG¶V+LJKODQGVDQG,VODQGV7UDQVLWLRQ5HJLRQZRXOGEHDOORFDWHG¼PLOOLRQOHDYLQJ
¼PLOOLRQIRU/RZODQGVDQG8SODQGV6FRWODQGDQ MDR). 
x In Wales, the West Wales Less-Developed Regions ZLOO UHFHLYH ¼ PLOOLRQ DQG (DVW
Wales (a More-Developed RHJLRQ¼PLOOLRQ 
 
5.2.2 Allocations to ERDF and ESF 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSURSRVDOWRDOORFDWHa minimum amount of funding to the European Social Fund is 
still under discussion among EU institutions. The main concerns for Member States are the ring-
fencing of a greater share of funding to the ESF and there are potential difficulties for absorbing 
funding particularly in Less Developed and Transition Regions. 
x Austria. Currently, 43.5 percent of Structural Funds go to the 2 ESF OPs in 2007-13. The 
Austrian authorities consider that a similar division in 2014-20 would most likely be sufficient, 
although an increase may be required by the new EU rules.  
  
x Germany. Federal authorities are working on the assumption that there will be a 50/50 
division overall between the ERDF and ESF ± although the final outcome will depend on the 
outcome of the regulatory negotiations. This issue is particularly important in the current 
Convergence and Phasing-out regions, where overall division is currently 70/30 in favour of 
the ERDF but would shift to 60/40 in Transition Regions in 2014-20. The issue is less difficult 
in the RCE regions, where the division in 2007-13 is already 50/50 (compared to a proposed 
52/48 split in 2014-20) so there would be no major change in 2014-20. The implications of a 
shift in weighting from the ERDF to the ESF would be particularly acute in the current 
Phasing-out regions, where the reduction in overall SF funding is proposed to be particularly 
strong. The overall cut in funding plus the increase in the share of funds for the ESF would 
imply that the ERDF alone would have to absorb the cut in funds. There are concerns over 
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the economic development implications of a strong shift in funding towards the ESF, partly 
because demand for some types of ESF intervention is limited due to falling unemployment; 
and because of the preference for a broad-based policy response in the eastern German 
Länder combining investment in education/training and other ESF-type interventions with 
ERDF-type support (e.g. RTDI, infrastructure, business support) and broader measures (e.g. 
to encourage appropriate immigration). 
 
x Poland. ESF interventions in the Structural Funds are adopted at the level of 20 percent for 
less developed regions and 45 percent for Mazowieckie. This means that the ESF 
contribution will be close to the current (2007-13) period. 
 
x UK. It is likely that there will be a minimum amount that must be dedicated to the ESF at UK 
level (about 46 percent) with some flexibility how this is met across the country. The 
Government recognises that there may be more difficulty absorbing high levels of ESF in less 
developed and transition regions. In its guidance to Local Enterprise Partnerships, the 
Government proposes that in Less Developed Regions, the aim should be to dedicate 25 
percent as European Social Fund; in Transition Regions 40 percent; and in More Developed 
Regions 50 percent. It recognises that there may be a need for adjustments if overall the total 
does not add up to the minimum for the UK, taking account of allocations in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. 
 
5.3 European Commission dialogue and guidance  
5.3.1 The CommiVVLRQ¶V3RVLWLRQ3DSHUV 
In late 2012, the Commission has produced national Position Papers to provide a framework for 
dialogue with each Member State on the content of the 2014-20 Partnership Agreements and 
Programmes in advance of the formal negotiations. The Position Papers were sent to the Member 
States and discussed in bilateral meetings towards the end of 2012, followed by further informal 
meetings on key themes during 2013. The papers share a common structure and provide the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V YLHZV RQ HDFK FRXQWU\¶V GHYHORSPHQW FKDOOHQJHV DORQJ ZLWK SURSRVDOV IRU IXQGLQJ
priorities, thematic and specific objectives, and governance recommendations. A comprehensive 
review of the content of the papers for all EU28 Member States has been published in another EPRC 
Briefing Paper.39 The main focus here is on the views of EoRPA Member States.  
The reaction of most countries to their respective Position Paper has generally been positive. 
A key perceived benefit for programming is the provision of more clarity on the European 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V SRVLWLRQ Managing authorities welcomed WKH LQVLJKW JDLQHG LQWR WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
thinking and key priorities covering all the relevant Commission DGs (Italy, Poland, United Kingdom). 
Confirming expectations about shared goals is another perceived positive outcome of the exercise 
(Netherlands, Poland). In Italy, the dialogue has been constructive and differences of opinion have 
ODUJHO\ EHHQ DGGUHVVHG ,Q JHQHUDO WKH *HUPDQ DXWKRULWLHV VXSSRUW WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V DSSURDFK RI
                                                 
39
 Mendez C, Bachtler J and Granqvist K (2013) European Commission Perspectives on the 2014-2020 
3DUWQHUVKLS$JUHHPHQWV	3URJUDPPHV$&RPSDUDWLYH5HYLHZRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V3RVLWLRQ3DSHUV, European 
Policy Research Paper, No. 84 , Glasgow. Available at: 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_84.pdf (accessed 6 June 2013). 
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endeavouring to link Structural Funds more strongly with EU-level strategies for economic growth and 
employment and also of concentrating funds on specific thematic objectives so that funds are not 
VFDWWHUHG LQHIIHFWLYHO\ µZDWHULQJ FDQ¶ RU Giesskanne DSSURDFK 6LPLODUO\ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
emphasis on a smaller menu of options is welcomed in the United Kingdom, as it is thought that this 
can deliver more impact than a more diffused approach. Although Austrian policy-makers had initially 
some concerns when the paper was presented in October 2012, federal authorities now consider the 
paper to be in line with their own views on the forthcoming programme period.  
The Position Papers are seen as providing a useful tool for programming in two main ways. 
First, the papers have helped to structure the on-going, informal dialogue and bilateral meetings 
between the Member States and Commission services on key themes. Second, the papers can 
support the process of domestic debate and programming. In Austria, a consultancy supporting the 
national authorities in the development the PA provided an in-depth analysis of the Commission 
Position Paper translating the core funding priorities and thematic/specific objectives into the relevant 
investment priorities of the draft ERDF, ESF and EAFRD Regulations to ensure coherence Lastly, the 
Commission recommendations have been useful in justifying planned changes in regional 
programmes to beneficiaries, as in Poland where it could be used to support a decision not to support 
the construction of local roads and sport infrastructure.  
Several drawbacks, tensions or inconsistencies were also highlighted. First, there is uncertainty and 
disagreement about the legal status of the Position Papers. Commission statements and guidance 
have given the impression that the papers are binding instruments that must be fully taken into 
account, but this view has been rejected by a number of Member States that see the papers as 
unbinding guidance, not least because there is no reference to the document in the draft Regulations. 
The Commission has countered that the purpose of the papers is to open a dialogue and that even if 
WKHSDSHULVQRWUHIHUHQFHGLQWKH5HJXODWLRQVLWSUHVHQWVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQZKLFKPXVWEH
taken into account in the programming of the Funds.  
The administrative workload associated with reviewing and addressing the number of 
recommendations is a further challenge. This is compounded by the need to take account of other 
EU-level guidance documents, programming templates as well as the National Reform Programmes. 
(Moreover, there is a degree of uncertainty in working with guidance documents that are developed in 
parallel to the informal dialogue with the Member States and that contain elements that depend on the 
on-going negotiations on the legislative framework. 
7XUQLQJQRZ WR WKHFRQWHQWRI WKH3RVLWLRQ3DSHUV WKHPDLQFRQFHUQVDUHDERXW WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
analysis of challenges, proposed objectives and targets, and governance arrangements. 
x Development challenges. The United Kingdom notes that the three key challenges set out in 
the Position Paper are very broad and some key contributors to growth in some areas are not 
mentioned (e.g. infrastructure) or are not given enough prominence (e.g. intermediate and 
higher level skills).  
 
x Territorial dimension. A consequence of the thematic organisation of the papers is a lack of 
sensitivity to territorial specificities or synergies across different domains. For instance, the 
papers do not sufficiently recognise that the barriers to growth differ across regions, and that 
policy preferences and local solutions will accordingly differ across countries.  
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x Concentration. While the broad approach taken by the Commission is welcomed in many 
countries, this does not sit easily with concentration requirements or recognise domestic 
policy efforts in these themes. The United Kingdom does not plan to support all of the 
proposed activities as they are not all considered to be a priority for Structural Funds (for 
example, in England), especially because the Structural Funds represent a modest proportion 
of domestic expenditure and other channels of funding are available to address some issues. 
By contrast, German managing authorities note that the Commission is encouraging 
concentration in the Partnership Agreement (not simply within programmes), which is 
challenging in a large and economically diverse country.  
 
x Europe 2020 targets. The Position Papers list the national Europe 2020 targets included in 
National Reform programmes, omitting those targets that have not been signed up to by 
some Member States, as is the case with the United Kingdom position paper (i.e. targets 
relating to the employment rate, R&D expenditure levels, early school leavers and those 
engaging in tertiary education). The United Kingdom argues that the Commission must 
respect this in the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement and programmes.  
 
x Thematic Objectives. The Commission has identified what it considers to be the most 
important Thematic Objectives for each Member State. The main concern is ensuring that the 
Thematic Objectives are sensitive to Member State needs and challenges. This requires a 
degree of flexibility with respect to national or regional objectives that may not be included or 
given sufficient emphasis in the Position Papers. For instance, some of the current 
Convergence regions in Germany consider that there is still a need for other types of 
intervention that are not listed within the 11 Thematic Objectives. Another issue concerns the 
approach to conceptualising the thematic objectives and the underlying logic. Italy argues that 
it is necessary to examine the thematic objectives within the framework of overarching meta-
objectives relating to efficiency and equity. Other specific thematic concerns include: 
 
o Information and Communication Technology. There is a question of funding ICT 
infrastructures in more-developed regions, where the Commission position (against) does 
not seem to be in line with recent negotiations at the EU level. The Scottish managing 
authorLW\ILQGVWKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVODFNUHJLRQDOVSHFLILFLW\HJZKDW
is stated for the United Kingdom as a whole with regards to ICT provision does not hold 
for parts of Scotland such as the Highlands and Islands. 
 
o Business competitiveness. The German authorities argued strongly during negotiations 
on the text of the Structural Funds regulations for changes relating to business aid (i.e. 
the inclusion of aid for large firms, especially for projects relating to R&D and energy 
efficiency) and business-oriented infrastructure. Even though these interventions are in 
principle eligible, it may not be possible to allocate much funding to these types of project 
GXH WR WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHPDQG WKDW IXQGLQJ EHFRQFHQWUDWHGVWURQJO\RQ WKH WKHPHV
with threshold values and because of the approach taken in the Position Paper. 
 
o Low-carbon economy. While there is a requirement to spend at least 20 percent of 
ERDF through the low-carbon Thematic Objective, the United Kingdom Position Paper 
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only encourages investments in sustainable transport under this heading. The Paper 
suggests investments in renewable energy, which could also contribute to meeting this 
thematic concentration goal, should sit under the resource efficiency Thematic Objective. 
This will affect programme planning and needs clarification. Similarly, Greek authorities 
argue for a broader description of actions under the low-carbon economy theme. 
 
o Accessibility. &RQWUDU\WRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VYLHZ)LQODQGLVNHHQRQLQFOXGLQJDUHJLRQDO
accessibility priority in the programme, albeit limited to Northern and Eastern Finland 
where population is sparse and distances are long.  
 
o Transport. In Poland, the construction of regional roads will continue although the 
Commission would prefer a focus on railways. In the opinion of the ERDF unit, railways 
should be supported by central government (although the new ROP will also support 
railway investment through the purchase of rolling stock through a company owned by the 
regional government). 
 
o Social cohesion. The importance given to the different ESI Funds varies and, in some 
cases, the ESF themes are considered to be overrepresented (Austria). Contrary to the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V DSSURDFK GXULQJ WKH QHJRWLDWLRQV RI WKH 5HJXODWLRQV Italy considers that 
the Commission has taken a more narrow view of social cohesion, restricted to the 
promotion of employment for disadvantaged groups. Nationally, the Italian view is that 
social inclusion should be intended more broadly to include various inclusion problems 
and targeting various groups, e.g. elderly, immigrants, minors, women, child poverty etc.  
 
o Macro-regional cooperation. Some Member States consider that there is an over-
emphasis on macro-regional strategies, such as the Baltic Strategy (Denmark). In a 
similar vein, the United Kingdom authorities note that coverage of the Atlantic Strategy in 
the United Kingdom Partnership Agreement should be proportionate to its contribution to 
domestic economic strategies.  
 
o Ageing. Finland agrees with the emphasis placed on the ageing theme in the position 
paper, but views this as a multifaceted, cross-cutting challenge that must be tackled with 
a range of measures including those targeted at increasing skills in the workforce and 
youth unemployment.  
The Position Papers also review the future governance arrangements, including proposals relating to: 
ex-ante conditionality; country-specific recommendations; the programme architecture; coordination 
arrangements; horizontal principles; partnership; financial management, audit and control; 
administrative capacity; and monitoring and evaluation.40 The main concerns and issues raised by 
EoRPA countries are as follows. 
x Conditionality. 7KH&RPPLVVLRQKDVLQFOXGHGDUDQJHRIµJHQHUDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVWRLPSURYH
JRYHUQDQFHDQGGHOLYHU\¶XQGHU WKH7KHPDWLF2EMHFWLYHVSURSRVHG LQ WKHSDSHUVZKLFKDUH
considered to exceed its competences and provide additional conditions on funding. For 
example, the United Kingdom authorities note that the recommendations relating to access to 
                                                 
40
 For a detailed review, see Mendez et al. (2013) op. cit. 
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publicly funded training and synergies with the Youth on the Move initiative, should not 
constitute preconditions for approval of the Partnership Agreement and programmes.  
 
x Country-specific recommendations. The Commission identified the relevant 2012 Country-
specific Recommendations as part of the European semester process, which should provide 
a strategic reference point for informing the content of the PA and OPs. This is not seen as 
being problematic in several countries where there is perceived to be complementarity and 
consistency between the relevant CSRs or the National Reform Programmes and the goals of 
domestic policies to which SF contribute (Finland, Germany, Netherlands), particularly under 
the ESF (Germany). The main issue for Italy is that the CSR are directly relevant for Cohesion 
policy as insisted during the Council negotiations of the Common Provisions Regulation.  
 
x Regionalisation of OPs. As noted, the Commission recommends maintaining ESF OPs at 
the national level for many countries. However, regional councils in France would prefer 
regionalisation of ESF in its entirety and believe that there is some reticence on the part of the 
Commission to engage with new actors at the regional level. 
 
x Number of Intermediate Bodies. The Commission has encouraged Finland to reduce the 
number of intermediate bodies and streamline administration. However, the number of 
intermediate bodies is not seen as being a problem, rather they ensure efficient decision-
making and better guidance for beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the managing authority has taken 
steps to align the administrative processes (e.g. payment process) of different bodies. 
 
x Project selection. The Commission has recommended more use of project calls in France, 
but the national position on this is not clear yet. Opinions are divided as to the usefulness of 
the calls (which might exclude certain actors) and whether it is better to use both, closed and 
open calls. 
 
5.3.2 The template and guidance on the Partnership Agreement  
Another element to support the drafting of the PAs, are the draft template and guidelines on the PA 
content published by the Commission in January 2013. Modifications were made to take on board 
Member State comments and a second draft was presented and discussed in March 2013. The 
guidance is structured according to PA objectives, implementation issues and the integrated approach 
to territorial development, based on elements set out in the Common Provisions Regulation.  
The reception of this document has been mixed. On the positive side, a number of countries consider 
that the template and guidance provides a useful tool for drafting the PA and/or providing more 
certainty on Commission expectations (e.g. Austria, Finland, France, Italy, Sweden).  
The main criticisms are four-fold. First, it is argued that the template and guidance encourages a 
formalistic approach and format to the PA based on disaggregated tables, which hinders the ability 
to present a narrative of the strategy for public communication and dialogue with stakeholders 
(France, United Kingdom). Along with complaints about the template being too long and making too 
many demands (Germany, Netherlands), there is a concern that the approach is reinforcing a 
historical trend towards placing more priority on compliance tasks than on policy content (Austria).  
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Second and related, there are concerns about the Commission exceeding its decision-making 
competences. There is a concern that the template goes beyond what is foreseen in the regulations 
*HUPDQ\ 1HWKHUODQGV 5HODWHG WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V 3RVLWLRQ 3DSHUV DUH SUHVHQWHG LQ WKH 3$
template as an additional, compulsory legal requirement to take account in programming rather than 
as guidance documents to facilitate the informal dialogue (Italy).  
Third, the process of distinguishing OP content from PA content has been challenging where 
the two documents are largely based on the same material. Within the United Kingdom, 
authorities in Wales note that there is duplication with the OP template requirements, as the Welsh 
PA chapter will rely heavily on the content of the final OPs. In the case of Finland, there will be only 
one national programme for ERDF and ESF, which means that there will be significant overlaps in the 
Partnership Agreements and the programme. Italy considers that the guidance has too rigid a 
distinction between the national and regional level, which is inappropriate for multi-level governance 
contexts. 
Finally, there is a lack of clarity on the PA word limit or guidance on the length of different 
sections, which contrasts with the prescriptive approach in the OP template guidance where strict 
limits are pre-defined in the template (Austria, Finland, United Kingdom).  
5.4 Added value of Partnership Agreements  
A central goal underpinning the regulatory design innovations to the new Partnership Agreements for 
2014-20 is to support a greater strategic orientation to programming. Although it is still too early 
to provide a full assessment, the view of some countries is that this goal is being achieved. For 
instance, in Poland the key programming principles embodied in the PA will be important for ensuring 
thematic concentration in the programmes and driving the results-orientation linking the programmes 
more directly to specific indicators. The United Kingdom Partnership Agreement will be a more 
concrete document than the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). It is intended to be a 
PRUHSUDFWLFDOXVHIXO µEXVLQHVVSODQ¶ IRU WKH8QLWHG.LQgdom than the previous NSRF. Similarly, in 
Italy the impression is that the PA is viewed more positively than the past NSRF/CSFs because of its 
more operational and results-oriented nature. 
Another strategic function of the PA is to build consensus around a shared strategy. French 
authorities highlight the role of the PA in promoting shared ownership between different actors at 
different levels based on close cooperation in the development of the document. In Germany, the 
approach of developing the PA is bottom-up with repeated iteration between the federal and Land 
levels, as was the case with the NSRF. In the case of the United Kingdom, the PA will be more locally 
informed than the current NSRF, not least because of the current domestic importance of the local 
agenda. 
Nevertheless, the main driver of strategic shifts in the thematic content of the PA and 
programmes are the new thematic concentration obligations (Germany). In this sense, it is not 
the PA per se that is driving strategic concentration and direction but rather the pre-defined regulatory 
objectives on spending priorities at EU level.  
Another key goal of the PA is to encourage a more integrated approach to programming across 
the ESI Funds. The expectations are largely positive in this respect (Austria, Finland, United 
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Kingdom). PA consultations have often sought feedback on this issue to support the development of 
the strategy. At the very least, the definition of the scope of intervention across all ESI Funds in a 
single national document is likely to improve options to make use of combinations of funding and to 
allow better information exchange about activities. Arguably more important is the new option to use 
multi-fund programmes combining the ERDF, ESF and CF, which is being taken up in several 
countries (see next section). The priority attached to territorial instruments represents a further 
opportunity to develop a more integrated approach, especially across CF, ERDF and ESF (Poland).  
There are other informal arrangements for encouraging integration that are not tied to specific 
regulatory requirements. For instance, in Germany there seem to be stronger efforts at Land level to 
find practical means of improving coordination between the four different EU Funds in 2014-20 
(ERDF, ESF, EAFRD, EMFF) compared to 2007-13, e.g. via more cooperation between managing 
authorities, joint ex-ante evaluations, domestic strategic political agreements covering all four Funds, 
and endeavours to differentiate programme content more clearly. In France, authorities foresee 
further potential for pooling knowledge on certain aspects of the different funds at the national level 
and work is underway on the harmonisation of various documents (such as project applications) 
across the different Funds. 
A key challenge to integration relates to specificities of the different ESI Funds which have their 
own identity, constituencies and focus (France). While there are obvious links between different 
funds under some priorities, this is not always the case across all priorities or across all ESI Funds.  
Rural development coordination in particular is considered to be complicated and challenging 
(France, Germany, United Kingdom). Efforts to increase rural development coordination are of note in 
Poland. In the national programme financed by the EAFRD, some activities will be implemented at 
regional level in cooperation with regional governments, which will increase the level of coordination 
between activities of the ESF, ERDF and EAFRD in rural areas. For this purpose, a mechanism will 
be applied to select activities for the programme that are based on specific regional conditions, 
algorithms, and the allocation of resources between the regions. According to the draft PA, a major 
consideration in this architecture is the development of more integrated approaches, moving away 
IURPµVHFWRUDO¶WKLQNLQJ 
5.5 Programme Architecture 
There are elements of both continuity and change in the programme architecture for 2014-20 
across EU countries in terms of the number of programmes, the balance between national and 
regional programmes and the integration of Funds.  
As can be seen in Table 11, a significant reduction in the number of programmes is expected in 
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovenia, UK (England and Scotland). In Austria, there will be a joint Länder ERDF programme, with 
the current nine Land-level managing authorities continuing to play an important role in programme 
delivery. The planned 2014-20 model in England includes four single-fund national OPs within a 
single National Growth Programme (currently there are ten sub-national ERDF OPs in England, and 
one for each of the other Funds). In Finland, the current five programmes (four ERDF ROPs and one 
ESF NOP) will be reduced to just one national programme jointly funded by the ERDF and ESF. 
Rationalisation is also evident in Scotland, where the currently separate ERDF and ESF OPs for 
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Lowlands and Uplands Scotland and the Highlands and Islands (four OPs in total) are likely to be 
replaced with one Scotland-wide OP per Fund. Despite the centralisation in the programme 
architecture in these examples, it is argued that a strong regional and/or local dimension will remain in 
terms of the design, management and implementation of the strategies.  
Elsewhere, the number of programmes is likely to remain broadly unchanged (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK (Wales)), notwithstanding a 
reduction in the number of national programmes in some cases (Poland, Spain) or the introduction of 
integrated programmes combining ERDF and ESF (France, Greece, Poland, Portugal). The 
continuation of the existing and well-embedded regionalised structure of programmes in most of these 
countries militates against a substantial change in the number of programmes, especially in countries 
with federal/regionalised political systems where regional development competences are devolved. 
As noted, national programmes will be eliminated or reduced in Germany and Spain respectively, but 
this will not have a major impact on the overall number of programmes which are predominantly 
regional programmes. By contrast, in Sweden there will be a slight increase in the number of OPs as 
there will be an additional national OP to complement the existing regional OPs promoting sectoral 
and programme coordination. 
Another distinctive trend for 2014-20 is the introduction of multi-fund programmes, responding to 
the new voluntary provisions in the draft Regulations (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia). For 
instance, a single, jointly funded national programme is being developed in Finland combining the 
ERDF and ESF. In Italy, the two new national OPs Social Inclusion and Cities will be funded jointly by 
the ERDF and ESF but it remains to be seen whether the regions will also adopt the multi-fund 
approach. By contrast, integrated regional programmes will be adopted in France and Poland. In 
Poland, all 16 regional programmes will integratH WKH (5') DQG (6) )UDQFH¶V UHJLRQV DUH DOVR
developing joint ERDF-ESF regional programmes covering 35 percent of the ESF allocation (the 
remaining 65 percent will be managed through a national ESF OP). The multi-funding option will be 
used for both national and regional programmes in some cases (Czech Republic, Portugal). In 
Portugal, provisions have been made for multi-fund NOPs and ROPs for the mainland regions 
combining the ERDF and ESF (in ROPs) and potentially also the Cohesion Fund (NOPs). In the 
Czech Republic, a multi-fund ERDF-ESF approach is planned for the single ROP remaining (for 
Prague), and for the NOP Research, development and education. The main perceived benefits from 
the use of multi-fund programmes are more effective coordination and integration of territorial 
development investments (Finland, Greece, Poland, Slovenia). 
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Table 11: Estimation for the number of OPs  
Countries 
Current number of 
OPs TOTAL 
Indicative number of OPs for 2014-20 
TOTAL 
ERDF(+CF) ESF ERDF(+CF) ERDF+ESF(+CF) ESF 
Austria 9 2 11 1 0 2 3 
Belgium 4 6 10 3 0 3 6 
Bulgaria 5 2 7 4 2 1 7 
Croatia* 3 1 4 1 1 1 3 
Cyprus 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 
Czech Republic 14 3 17 5 2 1 8 
Denmark 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 
Estonia 2 1 3 0 1 0 1 
Finland 5 2 7 0 2 0 2 
France 31 5 36 4 28 1 33 
Germany 18 18 36 15 1 16 32 
Greece 10 4 14 4 13 1 18 
Hungary 13 2 15 5 4 0 9 
Ireland 2 1 3 2 0 1 3 
Italy 28 24 52 28 0 24 52 
Latvia 2 1 3 0 1 0 1 
Lithuania 2 2 4 0 1 0 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 
Malta 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 
Netherlands 4 1 5 4 0 1 5 
Poland 20 1 21 5 16 1 22 
Portugal 10 4 14 0 11 0 11 
Romania 5 2 7 12 0 2 14 
Slovakia 9 2 11 3 4 0 7 
Slovenia 2 1 3 0 1 0 1 
Spain 23 22 45 21 0 23 44 
Sweden 8 1 9 9 0 1 10 
UK 16 6 22 6 0 6 12 
Total 246 117 363 151 81 90 322 
Note: The total number of programmes does not include Croatia 
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For the remaining countries, the existing mono-fund approach will be continued (Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom). Multi-fund OPs will not be used 
in the United Kingdom, but the four England-wide single-fund OPs will contribute to an overarching 
QDWLRQDOµ*URZWK3URJUDPPH¶DQGDWWKHORFDO OHYHO ORFDOHFRQRPLFpartnerships (LEPs) will receive 
combined funding allocations made up of different Structural Funds. The main reasons for maintaining 
mono-fund OPs in Spain is that a shift in the programme architecture would entail additional 
administrative efforts and potential complications in financial management. Further, other instruments 
can be used within programmes ± such as CLLD or ITIs ± to advance the integration agenda (Spain, 
United Kingdom). There are also domestic political considerations that may explain the choice to 
maintain mono-fund programmes. In particular, the sectoral structure of public administration and the 
dispersal of regional policy management competences across ministries can lead to resistance 
against efforts to integrate programming across different Funds.  
5.6 Preparation of Operational Programmes 
The responsibility for preparing Operational Programmes lies at different levels of government across 
different Member States. This largely reflects differences in political systems (centralised, 
regionalised, federal) and whether national programmes are used. Accordingly, in addition to the 
country-level information collected through EoRPA research, the following review of the preparation 
and content of the OPs draws on regional information for some EoRPA countries based on research 
conducted by EPRC under the IQ-Net programme of knowledge exchange among managing 
authorities.41 
The draft OPs for 2014-20 are at different stages across countries. Anticipated dates of formal 
submission to the Commission range from September/October 2013 (or when the Regulations are 
approved, i.e. Austria, Finland) to March 2014 (United Kingdom). The later date in the case of 
England is mainly due to the agreement to design locally-driven programmes, based on Local 
Economic Partnerships, which have to be aggregated first to the national level under the OPs and the 
PA. In a number of countries there is uncertainty over submission dates, notably where OP 
development is at an early stage and where the main focus of activity has been on the PAs and on 
the implementation of the current programmes (e.g. Italy). Progress with the development of the 
intervention logic and selection of indicators and targets is also variable. As with the development of 
the PAs, key programming decisions are awaiting agreement on the 2014-20 EU budget and internal 
negotiations on Cohesion policy allocations, on the package of Cohesion policy Regulations (including 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V,PSOHPHQWLQJ5HJXODWLRQDVZHOODVGRPHVWLFVWUDWHJLHVQRWDEO\UHODWLQJWo smart 
specialisation). Nevertheless, extensive governmental and public consultation is underway in most 
countries, as well as the launch of ex-ante evaluations to inform programming.  
x Austria: The approval of the multi-regional ERDF OP is envisaged for autumn. A number of 
Länder (Burgenland, Tirol, Vorarlberg) were expecting governmental approval of their inputs 
in the summer of 2013. For instance in Niederösterreich, a first draft was prepared in May 
2013, although there are on-going discussions about streamlining and the inclusion of certain 
small-scale measures. In Steiermark, preparations for 2014-20 started with the preparation of 
a programme complement, which sets out practical implementation procedures. The strategic 
                                                 
41
 Mendez C, Kah S and Bachtler J (2013) Preparing for 2014-20: Programming, Concentration and 
Performance, IQ-Net Thematic Paper, 32(2), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow. 
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directions of the Steiermark part of the programme will follow a strategic document approved 
by the Land Government in October 2012, which sets out priorities for 2014-20. 
 
x Finland: OP preparations for 2014-20 were launched in 2012. The Ministerial Group on 
Administration and Regional Development outlined issues such as programme structure and 
regions, intermediary organisations and the role of regional management committees in 
March 2012 and thematic objectives in September 2012. The Finnish Operational Programme 
for 2014-20 will build on two regional plans (Northern and Eastern Finland; Western and 
Southern Finland) prepared by the regions and national themes prepared by the ministries. 
The final drafts of regional plans and national themes were finalised at the end of January 
2013 and the first draft of the OP in March 2013. The ex-ante evaluation of Finnish OP for 
2014-20 has progressed and has been closely integrated into the programme preparations. 
Finland is working towards submitting the OP to the Commission in August 2013. 
 
x France: First OP drafts were received between 15 June and 20 July 2013. Some are very 
advanced, other are less so. The initial absence of financial tables has made it difficult to 
develop the OPs, especially regarding result indicators. First complete drafts of the OPs were 
expected by 13 September, including the programme strategy and the thematic structure. 
These will be transmitted to the COM for informal feedback. Advanced drafts of the OPs will 
be developed by 15 October 2013.  
 
x Germany. The development of the OPs by the German Länder began in 2012. For instance, 
the Nordrhein-Westfalen Land government cabinet agreed a shared framework in March 2012 
for the future programmes, setting out core themes, in line with EU proposals. On the basis of 
this agreement, the managing authority developed a Key Issues Paper setting out the key 
themes and issues for discussion relating to the future ERDF OP. An extensive consultation 
was undertaken with partners on this document during 2012, and then a further strategic 
paper was presented to the Land cabinet at the end of 2012. There are on-going discussions 
over the priority axes to be included in the 2014-20 ERDF OP, particularly whether to include 
a fifth priority axis on environmental issues. Workshops have been organised on three priority 
axis themes in April/May 2013 with the relevant units in all the Land ministries. The managing 
authority is using the outcomes of the workshops to develop a first draft of the OP. Parts of 
the ex-ante evaluation for the Nordrhein-Westfalen ERDF OP have already been completed, 
namely the socio-economic analysis and the SWOT analysis.  
 
x Italy: Most of the preparatory work has focussed on the PA at this stage. The Southern 
regions have not yet started preparing their programmes as the focus is still very much on the 
delivery of the current programmes, but some of the Centre-North regions are more 
advanced. For instance, Tuscany has produced a regional strategic document and Emilia 
Romagna has also begun its preparations.  
 
x Netherlands: The OPs in the Netherlands are being developed by the regions and are at an 
advanced stage. Four OPs were reported to be 80 percent ready by the summer recess, and 
have been discussed with the state secretary. Feedback was also provided by the key 
sectors, universities and employer and employee organisations. A meeting for the final draft is 
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scheduled for October. The plan was to submit the OPs to the Commission by the end of 
October.  
 
x Poland: The Ministry of Regional Development produced guidelines for OP programming 
which will serve as a checklist when MRR appraises OP drafts for approval. The regional OPs 
are being drafted in Spring/Summer 2013 although the process is gradual as work is 
simultaneously underway on regional development strategies and territorial contracts. The 
Ministry of Regional Development has held a series of consultations in the regions. More 
important is the task of identifying key projects from the region which will be included in the 
PA. These will be proposed by the region and negotiated with the Ministry, reflecting regional 
specialisms.  
 
x Sweden: The Government has authorised the relevant County Administrative Boards, County 
Councils, municipalities and cooperation bodies to develop a proposal for regional 
programmes. The proposal for the national programme is developed by Tillväxtverket, 
Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, VINNOVA (Swedish Innovation Agency) 
and the Swedish Research Council. Tillväxtverket is the coordinating authority in the process. 
The proposal for the national programme will be submitted to the Ministry of Employment, 
Energy and Communications at the end of September 2013 and to the Commission 
thereafter, whereas the timetable for the regional programmes remains unclear.  
 
x United Kingdom. The drafting of the OPs in England is at an early stage, mainly because it 
has been agreed that the programme will be more locally-driven. The Local Enterprise 
Partnership (LEP) based model means that the content of LEP plans (currently under 
preparation) will first be aggregated to the national chapter of the PA, due to be completed in 
late 2013. The OPs will then be drafted in early 2014, to be submitted by March 2014. Some 
work is already underway, e.g. on the thematic priorities. In Scotland, the first steps in 
establishing the OPs were undertaken in late 2012. A set of three parallel surveys outlined 
collective priorities for future Structural Funds programmes. A public consultation on the 
content of the future programmes was launched in May 2013 at a stakeholder event and work 
on the OPs has progressed over the summer. In Wales, a public consultation process was 
launched in early 2013 LQYLWLQJFRPPHQWRQWKH:HOVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VVWUDWHJ\DQG6WUXFWXUDO
Funds priorities for 2014-20. Public events were held in various locations in Wales during 
February and March 2013. The managing authority planned to seek Government approval of 
the draft OPs in late September, with a view to submitting them to the Commission in 
October. Ex ante evaluations have also been launched in Scotland and Wales, and an ex 
ante evaluation of the English ERDF OP is currently being tendered for. 
 
5.7 Thematic concentration  
There is a formal requirement to concentrate spending on Europe 2020 goals for 2014-20. As 
required by the ring-fencing provisions in the draft Regulations (illustrated in Table 12), between 50-
80 percent of the ERDF must concentrate on the RTDI (TO 1), SME Competitiveness (TO 3) and 
Low-Carbon Economy (TO 4) Thematic Objectives, with a sliding scale that allows for lower 
concentration in Less Developed Regions (50 percent) and Transition Regions (60 percent) compared 
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to More Developed Regions (80 percent). Within these overall limits, further minimum thresholds have 
been specified for the Low-Carbon Economy Objective: 12 percent for Less Developed Regions, 15 
percent for Transition Regions and 20 percent for more-developed regions. By contrast, for the ESF 
at least 60-80 percent RI WKH IXQG¶V DOORFDWLRQ SHU SURJUDPPH ZRXOG FRQFHQWUDWH RQ XS WR 
Investment Priorities within the 3 Thematic Objectives: Employment (TO8), Social Inclusion (TO 9) 
and Education, Skills, and Learning (TO 10). Again, there is a sliding scale providing more flexibility to 
Less Developed and Transition Regions. 
Table 12: ERDF and ESF Ring-fencing requirements for 2014-20 
Thematic Objective Spending requirements by category of region  
Less Developed Transition Regions More Developed 
1. Innovation  
 
 
At Least 50 percent ERDF 






At Least 60 percent ERDF 





At Least 80 percent ERDF 













4. Low Carbon Economy At Least 12 percent ERDF 
must be spent on low carbon 
economy  
At Least 15 percent ERDF 
must be spent on low carbon 
economy 
At Least 20 percent ERDF 
must be spent on low carbon 
economy 
5. Climate Change 
Adaptation and Risk 
Prevention 
No minimum spend 
6. Environmental Protection 
& resource efficiency  No minimum spend 
7. Sustainable Transport and 
Network Infrastructure No minimum spend 
8. Employment  
At least 60 percent of ESF 
allocation per programme on 
up to 4 investment priorities 
within these 3 thematic 
objectives 
At least 70 percent of ESF 
allocation per programme on 
up to 4 investment priorities 
within these 3 thematic 
objectives. 
At least 80 percent of ESF 
allocation per programme on 
up to 4 investment priorities 
within these 3 thematic 
objectives. 
9. Social Inclusion 
(At least 20 percent of ESF 
allocation must be dedicated 
to this objective but ERDF 
expenditure might count 
towards this total) 
10. Education, Skills & 
Lifelong Learning 
 
This will not necessarily entail a major shift in thematic priorities, notably where the 2007-13 
programmes, especially under the RCE Objective, are already strongly focused on these themes. 
Nevertheless, shifts in spending are expected across and within objectives, notably towards the 
thematic objectives 1 (RTDI), 3 (SME) and especially 4 (Low-carbon). 
x Research, technological development and innovation (TO 1). Investment into R&D and 
innovation will be increased in the United Kingdom, Finland, France, Netherlands and Poland. 
This responds both to ring-fencing requirements and domestic priorities. In the United 
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Kingdom, it is accepted that the UK lags on R&D spend, and requires greater priority. The 
Finnish emphasis on innovation and knowledge development marks a shift from direct 
business aid to support for business and innovation environment. Interestingly, Poland will 
include investment in culture under the innovation KHDGLQJ VXSSRUWLQJ µLQWHOOLJHQW SURMHFWV¶
that support creativity, innovation, ICT as well as the development of human capital.  
 
x SME competitiveness (TO 3). Higher investments into SME support are envisaged in 
France. In Austria, Niederösterreich plans to increase funding for consultancy services for 
start-ups and for SMEs, mainly on environmental themes. By contrast, the proposed share of 
funding for SME support in the German land Nordrhein-Westfalen is higher than the current 
allocation (but lower than the ex-ante allocation in 2007-13). Current proposals take account 
of the fact that demand for SME funding has been lower than expected in 2007-13 because of 
other sources of SME financing, notably bank lending.  
 
x Low-carbon economy (TO 4). The required minimum of 20 percent for low-carbon measures 
in more-developed and transition regions requires substantial increase to this theme (UK-
England, Finland, France, Germany-Sachsen-Anhalt, Sweden). France and the Netherlands 
are considering going beyond the minimum allocation of 20 percent, in line with national 
objectives. At least 20 percent will be allocated to the theme in Sweden, comprising a 57 
SHUFHQW RI VKDUH RI WKH QDWLRQDO SURJUDPPH¶V WRWDO EXGJHW DQG  SHUFHQW RI WKH UHJLRQDO
programmes. In Finland, a specific low-carbon Priority is being considered, while England 
plans to increase the funding for carbon reduction (less so for renewable energy).  
Some examples of indicative thematic concentration plans at national and programme level are 
provided in Table 13, for Austria, Germany (Sachsen-Anhalt) and Poland. In Austria, the ERDF will 
concentrate on TOs 1, 3 and 4, which fits well with domestic priorities. At sub-national level. the 
German Länder Sachsen-Anhalt, LVLQWURGXFLQJDQLQWHUHVWLQJDSSURDFKWRDµPL[HG3ULRULW\D[LV¶LQLWV
regional Operational Programme, similar to other German Länder. This Priority axis would bring 
together funding from a number of different themes in the ERDF OP, i.e. all funding under the TOs 5 
(Climate change/risk prevention), 6 (Environmental protection), 7 (Transport), 9 (Social inclusion), and 
also some funding under TOs 1 (RTDI) and 4 (Low-carbon). This Priority axis would fund a range of 
themes relating to integrated measures for sustainable urban development (e.g. intelligent transport 
systems, urban development strategies, electro-mobility, flood protection etc.), with some funding 
partly channelled through traditional mechanisms, partly through competitive calls and partly through 
ITIs. Finally, as an example of a Member State with predominantly less-developed regions, Poland 
will see a greater share of resources allocated to TOs 1, 4 and 8 compared to 2007-13.  
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Table 13: Indicative allocations to objectives in Austria, Poland and Sachsen-Anhalt (%) 
Thematic Objective Austria Germany ±  
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Poland 
 ERDF ESF ERDF ESF ERDF, ESF and CF 
1 R&D and innovation 50-60  27.5  15.4-19 
2 ICT   10.0  4.7-6.2 
3 SME competitiveness 15-20  25.0  2-5.4 
4 Reducing CO2  20-25  22.0  4.8-9.3 
5 Climate change   3.7  1.3-2 
6. Environment and resource efficiency <5  4.7  9.9-12.4 
7 Transport and network infrastructure   1.0  28.63-32.3 
8 Employment   50-60  23.0 7-8 
9 Social inclusion and poverty <5 20 0.1 23.0 4.4-5.6 
10 Education, skills and life-long learning  20-25  50.0 6.5-8.2 
11 Institutional capacity <5 <5   1.3-1.5 
Technical assistance   4.0 4.0  
Total  100 100 100 100 
Sources$XVWULD¶VGUDIW3DUWQHUVKLS$JUHHPHQW6DFKVHQ-$QKDOW¶VLand cabinet decision of 12 February 2013; 
and Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2013) =DáRĪHQLD8PRZ\3DUWQHUVWZDSURJUDPRZDQLHSHUVSHNW\Z\
finansowej 2014-2020, 15 January 2013. 
Other notable shifts or developments within/across thematic objectives include:  
x ICT. Despite the efforts of the Commission to exclude ICT spending in more developed 
countries, France will continue placing considerable effort into the ICT theme, largely driven 
by the national target to reach a 100 percent high-speed broadband coverage within the next 
ten years. 
 
x Environmental protection and risk prevention. In Germany, Sachsen-Anhalt will increase 
funding for environmental measures more widely. Flood protection will not receive any 
funding anymore in Niederösterreich (Austria) and only under special conditions in Wales 
(United Kingdom). 
 
x Infrastructure. Some programme managers expect to witness a large decline in 
infrastructure support (e.g. Niederösterreich, Poland, Sachsen-Anhalt). Wales foresees the 
need to continue to invest in infrastructure where possible. In Finland, there will be some 
transport investment to increase regional accessibility for Eastern and Northern Finland, but 
traditional infrastructure projects, such as water management project, are no longer eligible.  
 
x Local and urban development. In France, 10 percent of the ERDF-ESF envelope will be 
DOORFDWHG WR µVHQVLWLYHXUEDQ]RQHV¶DW WKH OHYHORIHDFK23 The emphasis on metropolitan 
cities in Italy will increase through a dedicated national programme. By contrast, urban 
development will no longer be supported in Niederösterreich, although other Länder will 
contribute to the ring-fenced five percent for urban development (especially Vienna).  
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x Education, skills and learning. Increased support to education support is expected in 
England, France and Scotland. Particular priority on vocational training is anticipated in 
Denmark and on higher level skills in England and Scotland. 
 
x Social inclusion. Increased priority and spending is anticipated in Denmark, Finland and 
Italy.  
 
5.8 Programme management  
Changes and adaptation to programme management and implementation structures will be needed 
across all EU Member States to deal with the new regulatory requirements, i.e. on financial 
management and control, data exchange and the performance framework and reserve. There are 
also changes planned in the allocation of Cohesion policy competences across different levels of 
governance in response to shifts in the policy architecture and political priorities. 
Centralisation of programme management and delivery is taking place in several cases because of 
change in the programme architecture, efficiency considerations and coordination goals. 
x Finland: the replacement of regional programmes with a single national programme implies 
greater centralisation, mainly in response to cost-effectiveness reasons and the pursuit of 
better coordination across the ERDF and ESF. That said, it has also been decided to 
strengthen the roles of the Regional Councils and of the Regional Management Committees.  
 
x Italy: there will not be centralisation as such, as the regional OPs will be maintained and 
managed regionally, but the PA is foreseeing much stronger central coordination to be 
entrusted to the Department for Development and Economic Cohesion. The Department wil 
be transformed into an 'Agency for Territorial Cohesion' in 2014, tasked with monitoring the 
Cohesion policy implementation and supporting the management and implementation 
authorities, including the ability to take over the role of Managing Authority where there are 
serious shortcomings and delays. 
 
x Netherlands: there has been some discussion on whether the number of MAs should be 
maintained (at 4) or reduced/centralised. A decision was made to maintain the current 
number of MAs but to centralise back office functions such as: audit, definitions, application 
processes, IT systems, finance.  
 
By contrast, decentralisation of programme management and delivery is taking place in Poland, 
France and the United Kingdom.  
x France. Structural Funds will be decentralised to a significant extent. This applies mostly to 
ERDF, which will be fully decentralised (apart from a Technical Assistance envelope to be 
maintained at the national level), including the management of the four interregional OPs 
(river basins and mountainous areas). The management of EAFRD will also be decentralised, 
although a significant part of the funding will be allocated automatically to measures initiated 
by the State. The regions were also keen to obtain ESF management in its entirety, but it was 
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decided that 65 percent of ESF would remain in the hands of the central State (to be used to 
fund short-term training for unemployed), leaving 35 percent to the regions. Nevertheless, half 
of the State envelope will be effectively managed by sub-regional local authorities (conseils 
généraux) based on delegation.  
 
x Poland. The ongoing decentralization of the Cohesion policy implementation system means a 
much larger role in managing and implementing programmes at the regional level. Larger 
pool of funds allocated to the regional level will mean greater responsibility for their decisions 
and actions implemented. Additionally, responsibility for certification in the ROPs will move 
from regional state offices to regional self-governments that are managing authorities for the 
ROPs (in order to ensure separation of functions, Certifying Authorities will be located in 
regional government units outside of MA competences).  
 
x United Kingdom. In England, there will be decentralisation of the Structural Funds (ERDF 
and ESF) to sub-national bodies, leaving less than five percent to be directly managed at 
national level (compared to 50 percent at present). While programme management tasks (i.e. 
managing authority function) have been centralised during this programme period (although 
still sub-nationally located) and will be maintained in 2014-20, priority setting and project 
selection is to some extent being decentralised to new bodies at local level in response to the 
new local agenda. Local Enterprise Partnerships will play a role, although national managing 
authorities will continue to undertake the technical appraisal of projects and carry out final 
decision-making through Area Growth Teams located in their sub-national offices. The LEPs 
have some capacity concerns about their future role, as they vary widely in terms of staff 
numbers, experience and resources. 
Another trend in some countries is a significant reduction in the number of intermediate and 
implementing bodies (e.g. Austria, Germany). As an example, at regional level in Austria, 
Niederösterreich plans to reduce its Land-level intermediate bodies to just one. While there will still be 
four federal Intermediate Bodies, the Land Government department WST3, will be the only remaining 
intermediate body for ERDF funding in Niederösterreich. At the same time, the managing authority will 
try to increase its number of staff. Similarly, the German Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen also plans a 
significant reduction in the number of bodies involved in the delivery of the ERDF and is proposing 
that a single unit in each sectoral Land ministry could be designated formally as an intermediate body 
responsible for ensuring that all other units in that ministry accessing ERDF resources implement the 
appropriate procedures. Finland was also considering reducing the number of intermediate bodies to 
increase administrative efficiency, but because municipal financing will be increasingly important due 
to the reduced national budget, this is not possible.  
Finally, more consideration will need to be given to performance management issues due to the 
renewed emphasis on the results orientation. The starting point is programming. In particular, the 
Commission is expecting the programmes to include more clearly specified objectives, intervention 
ORJLFV DQG UHVXOWV WDUJHWV ,Q ,WDO\ WKH FKDQJH RI DSSURDFK LV SHUFHLYHG WR EH µUDGLFDO¶ LQ WHUPV RI
beginning with expected outcomes, before considering choices of actions to achieve the outcomes, 
and thereafter the necessary financial resources. This is considered to be a reversal in the 
programming logic compared to previous programme periods and has been incorporated into the 
national guidance alongside a number other principles to encourage a stronger performance 
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orientation (Box 2). SimilDUO\ 1HWKHUODQGV FRQVLGHU WKLV WR EH D µFRQFHSWXDO VWHS FKDQJH¶ UHTXLULQJ
substantial change in some regions, although the national Ministry is providing support on this to 
regions. Work began in 2011 with technical sessions on performance, intervention logic and 
LQGLFDWRUV0HHWLQJVZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VHYDOXDWLRQXQLWKDYHDOVREHHQKHOG LQYDULRXVFRXQWULHV
over the past year or two. In Finland, the possibilities that the intervention logic approach provides for 
finding a clear focus (and link between objectives and measures) for the programme have not been 
fully realised to date and could facilitate a more rigorous and focused programme. While the 
intervention logic or targets had not yet been formulated in the UK (England), the preliminary 
guidance distinguishes several steps for Local Enterprise Partnership to follow: (1) where are we 
now? (2 and 3) What is the need at sub-national level in the thematic area and what do we want to 
change? (4) What indicator will capture and measure that change? (5) What we set out to achieve 
and by when? In Austria, ÖROK is carrying out a project that should help to translate the new 
requirements with regard to results-RULHQWDWLRQ LQWR WKH $XVWULDQ FRQWH[W $XVWULD¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH
increased performance orientation is to avoid competition between programmes and Funds. Due to 
the Austrian programme architecture - one single national OP for ERDF, ESF, EAFRD and EMFF, 
although Burgenland may continue with its own ESF OP - performance will be measured and 
assessed separately for each Fund (and OP). 
Box 2: Methods and Objectives for an effective use of EU Funds in Italy, 2014-20 
 
1. Results-RULHQWDWLRQFOHDULGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHDFKLHYHPHQWVWREHUHDOLVHGHJµLQFUHDVHGQXPEHU
of researchers within ILUPV¶ µUHGXFHGHQHUJ\XQLW FRVW IRU ILUPV¶ µLQFUHDVH RI WKHQXPEHURISHRSOH
who use public transport etc.  
2. Actions: identification of actions capable of delivering the anticipated results, e.g. for the goal of 
increasing the number of researchers within firms, actions such as incentives for the employment of 
researchers within firms and the organisation of events where researchers and firms meet. 
3. Timetable: to pay attention to the delivery timetable of projects and the timetable profile of the 
programme as a whole, e.g. balancing out briefer and longer actions. This also includes a better ex 
ante appreciation of the financial circuit of each programme and fund, for instance through the use of 
timetables/road maps (and ensuring, in contrast with current practice, that the expenditure claims are 
sent to Brussels by September each year in order to be paid by the financial year). 
4. Strengthened partnership: to involve partners in the definition of calls for tenders; to extend the 
partnership to all actors that may bring knowledge to the process; and to increase transparency and 
dissemination of evaluation. 
5. Transparency: openness and inter-operability of data on all information pertaining to the policy 
(financial data and results achieved) (the projeFWµ2SHQ&RHVLRQH¶SURMHFW-based monitoring system 
operating for all programmes across the country, feeding the Open Coesione database; systematic 
use of monitoring visits undertaken in the early phases of project delivery (outcomes made public). 
6. Evaluation: priority to impact evaluation focussed on the effects on quality of life and opportunities 
for firms. Key questions: to what extent has the programme delivered its promises? To what extent 
has the programme been the driver for the results observed, compared to other intervening variables? 
7. National oversight: Identification of general lines of direction and rules which cannot be negotiated; 
strategic co-project design initiatives launched by the central state; transformation of the DPS in an 




Politiche Agricole, Alimentari e Forestali (2012) Metodi e obiettivi per un uso efficace dei Fondi comunitari 2014-
2020, 27 December 2012, at: http://www.governo.it/backoffice/allegati/70171-8341.pdf 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This report has provided a review and assessment of the EU Budgetary and Cohesion policy reform 
developments over the past year and the preparations for the 2014-20 period. This concluding section 
draws out key themes to emerge and implications for the future of Cohesion policy in the new period 
and beyond. 
6.1 Allocating funding to regions and programmes 
The European Council agreement on the long-term EU budget for 2014-20 contained some significant 
changes in EU spending, but some elements of continuity also. The European Parliament is due to 
vote shortly on the MFF, but it is unlikely to make significant changes to the headline figures as it 
DOUHDG\HQGRUVHGWKHVHLQDQHDUOLHU µSROLWLFDODJUHHPHQW¶ LQ-XO\)RU&RKHVLRQSROLF\WKHUH LV
now some certainty on national allocations for 2014-20. In late August 2013, DG Regio made public 
these indicative Cohesion policy allocations for each Member State and category of region.  
Comparing the 2014-20 allocations with the current allocations reveals marked shifts across EU 
Member States. Although the overall Cohesion policy budget falls, in six countries there is an increase 
in funding, with Ireland gaining the most in relative terms with a 16 percent increase on current 
allocations. However, in absolute terms this is rather modest. By contrast, three countries gain 
VLJQLILFDQWO\LQDEVROXWHWHUPVLQ3RODQGDOORFDWLRQVLQFUHDVHE\¼ELOOLRQZKLOHWKRVHLQ5RPDQLD
LQFUHDVHE\¼ELOOLRQDQGWKRVHLQ6ORYDNLDE\¼ELOOLRQ$WWKHRSSRVLWHHQGRIWKHVSHFWUXPWhere 
are very significant reductions in expenditure both in absolute and relative terms in a number of 
FRXQWULHV 7KHVH LQFOXGH 6SDLQ DQG *HUPDQ\ ZKLFK HDFK ORVH LQ H[FHVV RI ¼ ELOOLRQ LQ &RKHVLRQ
policy receipts, equivalent to well over a quarter of their current allocations. It is also noteworthy that 
Greece and Hungary also see major reduction in their allocations, even though these two countries 
did well from the negotiations. A key question is how these shifts will be managed internally within 
Member States. 
6.2 Improving the performance of Cohesion policy 
With the budgetary and regulatory negotiations on Cohesion reaching their conclusion at EU level, all 
Member States are now firmly focused on strategic planning for European Structural and Investment 
Funds in 2014-20. National and regional authorities have been developing their new Partnership 
Agreements (PAs) and Operational Programmes (OPs) and engaging in discussions with the 
European Commission, prior to submission of formal PAs towards the end of 2013 in most cases. 
There is evidence of closer strategic alignment across ESI Funds and with Europe 2020 themes, the 
latter being driven largely by the thematic concentration requirements. Major changes in the 
programme architecture are also expected in several Member States involving a considerable 
reduction in the number of programmes and the use of multi-fund programmes. 
The new requirements for 2014-20 envisage a stronger performance orientation involving more 
clearly specified objectives, intervention logics and results targets. Conditionality provisions aim to 
ensure that the pre-conditions for effective implementation of the Funds are put into place, while the 
new performance framework and reserve would provide incentives to reward the achievement of 
targets and sanctions for under-achievement. Accountability at EU level should be reinforced by 
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requiring the Council of Ministers to discuss the implementation and results of the CSF funds every 
two years. 
In introducing these changes, the draft regulatory framework responds to the findings of evaluation 
research and criticisms of Cohesion policy by placing a greater emphasis on performance. The 
requirement for conditionalities seeks to address the problem that the effectiveness of Cohesion 
policy interventions are undermined by deficiencies in the policy or institutional contexts. The focus on 
results is a consequence of the poorly framed and over-ambitious objectives of previous programmes 
that have given insufficient attention to the outcomes of interventions. And the enhanced performance 
framework responds to the lack of accurate and reliable monitoring data for assessing the progress 
and performance of programmes, and gives a higher profile to reporting. 
The question is whether the spirit as well as the letter of the new regulatory requirements will be met 
in practice. While there is evidence of increased attention to these issues in some countries, it 
remains to be seen whether a qualitative shift in the performance orientation will be achieved and 
delivered on the ground. Over the 2012-13 period there was evidence that managing authorities were 
slow to appreciate the changed context for programming and there has been considerable uncertainty 
regarding how to implement some of the expected changes in practice.  
Continuing the trend since the start of the 2000s, the regulatory framework for the 2014-20 period will 
see enhanced conditions and expectations placed on those responsible for managing and 
implementing the Funds in the Member States. Managing authorities and implementing bodies are 
under pressure: 
x to improve absorption and ensure faster spending through the decommitment rule 
 
x to ensure greater regularity in spending to reduce the error rate; 
 
x to implement the Funds through more targeted spending, currently through the earmarking 
requirement and in 2014-20 through thematic concentration and more strategic projects; and 
 
x to deliver more effective spending, through the results orientation and enhanced performance 
framework. 
Research on the use of conditions and conditionalities in public policy has warned of the difficulty of 
enforcing multiple requirements in framing agreements between levels of government and delivering 
interventions. In a Cohesion policy context, for example, it has been noted that the pressure to spend 
KDV VRPHWLPHV µGLVWRUWHG¶ SURMHFW VHOHFWLRQ GHFLVLRQV DZD\ IURP ULVN\ RU LQQRYDWLYH SURMHFWV ZKLFK
might be better suited to meeting programme objectives. Equally, it could be argued that 
concentrating resources on a smaller number and types of projects will allow better projects to be 
selected and more time to be invested in ensuring that they meet objectives on time and in line with 
regulatory requirements.  
6.3 ,PSOHPHQWLQJWKHµWHUULWRULDOGLPHQVLRQ¶RI&RKHVLRQSROLF\ 
The most tangible innovation with respect to the territorial dimension is the reinforced sub-regional or 
local agenda through the new provisions on Community-Led Local Development (CLLD), Integrated 
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Territorial Investments (ITIs) and sustainable urban development. There appears to be general 
VXSSRUW LQ SULQFLSOH IRU DQ µLQWHJUDWHG DSSURDFK WR WHUULWRULDO GHYHORSPHQW¶ DQG PDQ\ PDQDJLQJ
authorities have welcomed the option of using CLLD and ITIs. However, the degree to which these 
options will be used in practice is still unclear. There are reservations, for example, with the use of 
CLLD because of perceived administrative burdens or the lack of local capacity. There appears to be 
more interest in ITIs (e.g. in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Poland and Spain) for specific 
themes or types of area, but the administrative implications are still being worked through in many 
cases. Lastly, the increased focus on urban development has also gained widespread support 
(though not necessarily the prescriptiveness of the original Commission proposals) and fits with the 
territorial focus on urban centres in several national regional policies. 
6.4 Assessing the implications of economic governance changes for 
Cohesion policy 
Looking forward, there are some radical developmHQWVLQWKH(8¶VHFRQRPLFJRYHUQDQFHDJHQGDZLWK
potentially profound implications for the rationale of Cohesion policy, notably the mounting pressure to 
move towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union involving a more integrated financial, 
budgetary and economic policy framework. Tighter fiscal discipline on Member States could affect 
their capacity to co-finance Cohesion Policy, especially in countries with large Cohesion allocations 
and public expenditure constraints, while the proposals for a new fiscal capacity at EU level through a 
Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument may overlap with Cohesion Policy. Moreover, in using 
Cohesion policy as an economic governance tool to implement wider EU objectives, notably through 
macroeconomic conditionality and in supporting the implementation of Country-specific 
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV WKH SROLF\¶V WUDGLWLRQDO 7UHDW\ FRPPLWPHQW WR FRKHVLRQ DQG WKH UHGXFWLRQ RI
regional disparities is arguably being weakened. 
